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Abstract
Corporations in most countries are run by controlling shareholders whose cash ﬂow rights
are substantially smaller than their control rights in the ﬁrm. This separation of ownership
and control allows the controlling shareholders to pursue private beneﬁts at the cost of
outside minority investors by diverting resources away from the ﬁrm and distorting corpo-
rate investment and payout policies. We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
asset pricing model that acknowledges the implications of agency conﬂicts through imper-
fect investor protection on security prices. We show that countries with weaker investor
protection have more overinvestment, lower market-to-book equity values, larger expected
equity returns and return volatility, higher dividend yields, and higher interest rates. These
predictions are consistent with empirical ﬁndings. We develop new predictions: countries
with high investment-capital ratios have both higher variance of GDP growth and higher
variance of stock returns. We provide evidence consistent with these hypotheses. Finally,
we show that weak investor protection causes signiﬁcant wealth redistribution from outside
shareholders to controlling shareholders.
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Separation of corporate control from ownership is one of the main features of modern capital
markets. Among its many virtues, it allows for the participation of small investors in the
equity market, thereby increasing the supply of funds, dissipating risks across the economy,
and lowering the cost of capital for ﬁrms. Its major drawback is the agency conﬂi c tt h a ta r i s e s
between corporate insiders who run the ﬁrm and can extract private beneﬁts of control, and
outside minority investors who have cash ﬂow rights on the ﬁrm, but no control rights (e.g.,
Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976)). This agency conﬂi c ti st h ef o c u so f
a voluminous body of research in corporate ﬁnance, as recurrent corporate scandals constitute
an ever-present reminder of the existence of these conﬂicts and the private beneﬁts exploited
by insiders even in the least suspicious markets.
Following Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1998), a large empirical literature
has ﬁrmly established the existence of large shareholders in many corporations around the
world (La Portal et al. (1999)). These shareholders have much larger control rights within
the ﬁrm compared to their cash ﬂow rights as they obtain eﬀective control through dual-class
shares, pyramid ownership structures, or cross ownership (Bebchuk et al. (2000)). With the
separation of control from ownership, controlling shareholders have an incentive to expropriate
outside minority shareholders. This conﬂict of interest is at the core of agency conﬂicts in
most countries and is only partially remedied by regulation aimed at protecting minority or
outside investors. Indeed, considerable empirical evidence suggests that stock market prices
reﬂect the magnitude of the private beneﬁts derived by controlling shareholders, with ﬁrm
value increasing in both the extent of minority investors’ protection, and the stock ownership
of controlling shareholders.1 While it is intuitive that weak investor protection lowers equity
prices, the eﬀect of investor protection on equity returns and the interest rate is less obvious.
In this paper, we study the eﬀect of agency conﬂicts through imperfect investor protection
on equilibrium asset pricing. Our model departs from traditional production-based (investment-
based) equilibrium asset pricing models in three important ways. First, we acknowledge that
controlling shareholders are able to extract private beneﬁts and therefore make ﬁrm investment
decisions that are in their own interest. Second, we embed the separation of ownership and
control into an equilibrium asset pricing model in which both the controlling shareholder and
outside investors optimize their consumption and asset allocations. Hence, the equilibrium
asset prices aﬀect the investment and payout decisions of the controlling shareholder through
his preference to smooth consumption over time and, in turn, these investment and payout
decisions aﬀect the equilibrium asset prices. Third, we follow Keynes (1936) and Greenwood,
1For empirical work, see La Porta et al. (1999), La Porta et al. (2002), Claessens et al. (2002), Baek et
al. (2004), Doidge et al. (2004), and Gompers et al. (2003). For theoretical work, see La Porta et al. (2002),
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), and Lan and Wang (2004). See La Porta et al. (2000) for a survey of the investor
protection literature.
1Hercowitz, and Huﬀman (1988) in assuming that economy-wide output ﬂuctuations arise from
shocks to the marginal eﬃciency of investment as opposed to shocks to the productivity of
installed capital.
These new features imply that the controlling shareholder’s trade-oﬀs associated with the
corporate investment decision in our model diﬀer from the standard value-maximizing trade-
oﬀs. First, the controlling shareholder’s private marginal beneﬁt of investment is higher than
that of outside shareholders because of the private beneﬁts of control. In addition, in both
the model and the data (Barclay and Holderness (1989)), the level of private beneﬁts increases
with ﬁrm size.2 Second, in our model the controlling shareholder’s marginal cost of investment
has two parts; one is the traditional marginal cost of postponing consumption, and the other
is a new term reﬂecting the interaction between the controlling shareholder’s risk aversion and
our assumption that shocks shift the marginal eﬃciency of investment. Incremental investment
is subject to shocks that shift its productivity, thereby increasing the volatility in the capital
accumulation process. With a risk-averse controlling shareholder the additional volatility of
capital accumulation is costly as it lowers the controlling shareholder’s value function, ceteris
paribus. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to acknowledge this eﬀect of shocks
to the marginal eﬃciency of investment à la Keynes (1936) and Greenwood, Hercowitz, and
Huﬀman (1988) on the investment decisions of a risk-averse agent and on the ﬁrm’s Tobin’s q
(as shown later).
The usual technological assumption of productivity shocks attached to the production func-
tion implies that shocks shift the productivity of capital of all vintages in the same way. In
contrast, we follow Keynes (1936) and Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huﬀman (1988) in modeling
shocks as shifting the productivity of new capital goods only, leaving the productivity of in-
stalled capital unchanged. Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huﬀman (1988) argue that these shocks
may be important determinants of business cycle ﬂuctuations. Greenwood, Hercowitz, and
Krusell (1997, 2000) posit that shocks to the marginal eﬃciency of investment may arise from
shocks to the relative price of investment goods and quantify their relevance. Greenwood et al.
(1997) ﬁnd that approximately 60% of postwar-U.S. growth can be attributed to shocks to the
marginal eﬃciency of investment, whereas at the business cycle frequency, using a calibration
exercise Greenwood et al. (2000) ﬁnd that shocks to the marginal eﬃciency of investment ac-
count for about 30% of output ﬂuctuations in the postwar-U.S. period. Using an econometric
approach, Fisher (2003) ﬁnds that shocks to the marginal eﬃciency of investment account for
50% of U.S. business cycle ﬂuctuations well above the role played by neutral technology shocks.3
2Intuitively, the controlling shareholder in charge of a conglomerate is more likely to ﬂy private jets than one
h e a d i n gas m a l lﬁrm.
3The formulation in Greenwood et al. (1988) is a stochastic version of Solow (1960). Equivalently, our
formulation may be viewed as a version of the stochastic installation function, in which the productivity of new
investments depends on how compatible they are with existing vintages of capital. Under this interpretation,
our model extends the deterministic installation function proposed by Hayashi (1982) and Uzawa (1969) to a
stochastic setting.
2The controlling shareholder has an incentive to increase investment when investor protec-
tion weakens because the total amount of private beneﬁt extraction increases with ﬁrm size.
However, greater investment increases the volatility of capital accumulation, which is costly
for a risk-averse controlling shareholder. In equilibrium the eﬀect induced by the extraction
of private beneﬁts dominates. This leads to the model prediction that weak investor protec-
tion generates excessive investment and a high expected output growth rate in spite of higher
volatility of both investment and output in the economy. Overinvestment by the controlling
shareholder is in line with Jensen’s (1986) free cash ﬂow and empire building hypothesis.4 How-
ever, our model diﬀers from Jensen’s in that it generates overinvestment endogenously, with
the degree of overinvestment being mitigated by both the degree of investor protection and the
controlling shareholder’s ﬁrm ownership. To the extent that we do not model nonpecuniary
private beneﬁts from running a large corporation, the model is conservative on the size of over-
investment, and thus on the quantitative asset pricing and wealth redistribution implications.
Finally, the model prediction on a higher expected output growth rate for countries with low
investor protection is in line with the evidence in Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2004) for
closed economies.
Minority investors solve an intertemporal consumption and portfolio choice problem à la
Merton (1971) by taking dividends and security prices as given. Recall that under imperfect
investor protection, the controlling shareholder extracts private beneﬁts from the ﬁrm’s rev-
enue. This reduces ﬁrm value from the perspective of minority shareholders, which implies that
Tobin’s q is lower under imperfect investor protection. Consistent with the empirical evidence
cited above, improvements in investor protection in the model alleviate the agency conﬂicts,
reduce overinvestment, increase payouts, and increase ﬁrm value.
One of the model’s key predictions is that the expected excess equity return is higher in coun-
tries with weaker investor protection. Weaker investor protection implies higher agency conﬂicts
and thus more incentives to overinvest as argued earlier. Because the marginal eﬃciency of in-
vestment is stochastic, the dividend and stock price, which in equilibrium are proportional to
the aggregate capital stock, grow faster and are more volatile under weaker investor protection.
The covariation between the stock payout (dividend plus price) and consumption is thus greater
in countries with weaker investor protection. Therefore, weaker investor protection increases
the volatility of stock returns (via overinvestment) and implies a higher risk premium.
The model prediction on excess equity returns is consistent with the empirical evidence.
Hail and Leuz (2004) ﬁnd that countries with strong securities regulation and enforcement
mechanisms exhibit lower cost of capital levels than countries with weak legal institutions.
Daouk, Lee, and Ng (2004) document that improvements in their index of capital market
4See also Baumol (1959) and Williamson (1964). For evidence on overinvestment, see, for example, Lang,
Stulz, and Walking (1991), Blanchard, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994), Lamont (1997), and Harford (1999).
Gompers et al. (2003) and Philippon (2004) document that U.S. ﬁr m sw i t hl o wc o r p o r a t eg o v e r n a n c eh a v eh i g h e r
investment.
3governance are associated with lower equity risk premia. Using the cross-country data on
excess returns in Campbell (2003), we ﬁnd that civil law countries —those with weaker investor
protection (La Portal et al. (1998))— have higher average excess equity returns than common law
countries. Harvey (1995), Bekaert and Harvey (1997), and Bekaert and Urias (1999) show that
emerging markets display higher volatility of returns and larger equity risk premia. Similarly,
Erb et al. (1996) ﬁnd that expected returns, as well as volatility, are higher when country credit
risk is higher. Since emerging market economies have on average weaker corporate governance,
this empirical evidence lends further support to our theory.
The model also predicts that countries with weaker investor protection not only observe
overinvestment, but also higher interest rates. Overinvestment (associated with weak investor
protection) implies a larger future output; intertemporal consumption smoothing motivates
agents to ﬁnance current consumption by borrowing, which leads to a higher current equilibrium
interest rate. However, overinvestment also makes capital accumulation more volatile and
implies a stronger precautionary saving eﬀect, thus exerting downward pressure on the current
equilibrium interest rate. The former eﬀect dominates for low values of the investment-capital
ratio, implying that interest rates are higher under weaker investor protection. Using the
interest rate data in Campbell (2003), we ﬁnd that civil law countries —those with weaker
investor protection (La Portal et al. (1998))— have higher average interest rates than common
law countries. The eﬀect of investor protection on the dividend yield depends on the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution. When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is smaller than
unity, as most estimates indicate, the substitution eﬀect is dominated by the income eﬀect.
Thus, the lower interest rate that results from stronger investor protection gives rise to a
smaller demand for current consumption and thus a lower dividend yield, ceteris paribus.
We present a calibration of the model that allows us to derive quantitative predictions
regarding asset prices as well as quantify how much minority investors will gain, and how much
controlling shareholders will lose, by moving to perfect investor protection. We calibrate the
model to the United States and South Korea to match estimates of private beneﬁts in the two
countries. The agency distortions imply that moving to perfect investor protection leads to a
stock market revaluation of 2%f o rt h eU . S .a n d15% for Korea. Our calibration also shows
that minority investors in the U.S. (Korean) are willing to give up 1% (10%)o ft h e i rw e a l t ht o
move to a perfect investor protection world. U.S. (Korean) controlling shareholders are willing
to give up 1.7% (6.2%) of their wealth in order to maintain the status quo. These simple
calculations imply signiﬁcant wealth redistribution from controlling shareholders to outside
investors when investor protection is strengthened. Of course, realizing the political reform
necessary to improve investor protection is by no means an easy task, precisely because of
the signiﬁcant wealth redistribution that it entails. After all, the controlling shareholders and
incumbent entrepreneurs are often among the strongest interest groups in the policy making
process, particularly in countries with weaker investor protection.
4We test two new empirical predictions. Our model predicts a positive association between
the investment-capital ratio and both the variance of GDP growth, and the variance of stock
returns, after controlling for exogenous volatility sources. We construct measures of the long-
run investment-capital ratio and test our hypotheses on a cross-section of 44 countries. We
provide evidence consistent with both hypotheses. We also ﬁnd some evidence that the eﬀect
of investor protection on volatility is subsumed in the investment-capital ratio, particularly for
the volatility of stock returns.
Related Literature
Our model is cast in an agency-based asset pricing framework. This is in contrast with the
majority of asset pricing models, which are constructed for pure exchange economies (Lucas
(1978) and Breeden (1979)). Our approach also contrasts with the existing literature link-
ing asset prices to physical investment decisions. Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (CIR) (1985) and
Sundaresan (1984) provide a theory of equilibrium asset prices based on a ﬁrm’s value max-
imization. Cochrane (1991) links the marginal rate of transformation to the cost of capital.
These production-based asset pricing models abstract away from agency conﬂicts and hence do
not generate any predictions on asset returns across countries that would result from variation
in the quality of corporate governance. We incorporate the eﬀect of agency costs on equilib-
rium asset prices. Obviously, our model also relates to the heterogeneous-agent equilibrium
asset pricing literature,5 in which the heterogeneity arises from the diﬀerent income streams
and choice variables for the controlling shareholders and outside investors.
The paper that is most closely related to ours is Dow et al. (2004). Dow et al. (2004)
develop a model in which the manager has an empire building preference as in Jensen (1986);
the manager wants to invest all of the ﬁrm’s free cash ﬂow if possible. As a result, the shareholder
needs to use some of the ﬁrm’s resources to hire auditors to constrain the manager’s empire
building incentives. In contrast, our paper is motivated by the empirical observation that
managers in most countries around the world are often controlling shareholders who themselves
have cash ﬂow rights in the ﬁrm and who trade oﬀ the gains from pursuing private beneﬁts
with the cost of decreasing their share of ﬁrm value. The critical determinant of this trade-oﬀ
is the extent of investor protection, as convincingly documented by the large empirical research
indicated above. Our model generates an increasing relation between ﬁrm value and investor
protection. Intuitively, stronger investor protection implies lower agency cost and thus higher
Tobin’s q, as observed empirically. This diﬀers from Dow et al. (2004), who predict that Tobin’s
q is equal to one, independent of agency.
A second point of departure from Dow et al. (2004) is that they assume that all ﬁrm
claimants are identical. The manager partly decides on the cash ﬂow paid to shareholders, but
5Asset pricing models with investor heterogeneity have mostly been worked out in the paradigm of endowment
economies, with studies analyzing heterogeneity in preferences, endowments, and beliefs. See Campbell (2003)
for a recent survey.
5has no role in aﬀecting the equilibrium discount factor. Moreover, the equilibrium marginal
rate of substitution of the representative consumer in their paper is determined by setting the
representative consumer’s consumption equal to the dividend. In contrast, our paper explicitly
incorporates the consumption and asset allocation decisions of both the controlling shareholders
and outside minority investors. This brings us to the third main diﬀerence between the two
models. In our model, the corporate investment decisions of the controlling shareholder are
aﬀected by the equilibrium security prices; the consumption and asset allocation decisions of all
agents aﬀect the equilibrium prices, which in turn determine the willingness of the controlling
shareholder to smooth consumption through the capital accumulation and payout policies of the
ﬁrm. One key implication of Dow et al. (2004) is that the risk premium is lower in their agency
setting than in the no-agency benchmark. However, and consistent with the evidence provided
above, our paper predicts a higher risk premium in countries with low corporate governance.
There are now several papers linking agency to ﬁrm investment decisions. The analysis of
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) is set in a general equilibrium context. Their assumption of risk-
neutral agents implies that the model is silent with respect to how agency aﬀects the economy’s
risk premium. Both Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) and Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald
(2004) focus on the implications of weak investor protection on the equilibrium interest rate
rather than the risk premium. In contrast to what we ﬁnd, both these papers predict that
countries with better investor protection have higher interest rates (see also Gorton and He
(2003)). In a partial equilibrium context with risk neutrality, La Porta et al. (2002) provide
an explanation for the observed direct relation between Tobin’s q and investor protection. Lan
and Wang (2004) extend their analysis to a dynamic equilibrium analysis with entrepreneurs
and outside minority investors. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love (2002) analyze a risk-averse
controlling shareholder’s investment decision under imperfect investor protection in a two-period
partial equilibrium setting and derive implications on the ﬁrm’s cost of capital. Their model
predicts that ownership is more concentrated under weaker investor protection (see also Shleifer
and Wolfenzon (2002)), and a higher ownership concentration in the presence of the ﬁrm’s
idiosyncratic risk induces underinvestment and a higher cost of capital.
In another related agency setting, Holmstrom and Tirole (2001) propose an equilibrium
asset pricing model by assuming that the entrepreneur is able to extract private beneﬁts from
the ﬁrm and cannot promise to fully return investors’ funds. As a result, collateralizable assets
that can be seized by investors when the ﬁrm is in ﬁnancial trouble command a premium. This
generates an ex ante desire to hoard liquidity in order to increase funding, thereby leading
to a liquidity premium. Cooley et al. (2004) build a model of ﬁnancing constraints that are
endogenously generated because of weak creditor protection à la Albuquerque and Hopenhayn
(2004) and derive implications for aggregate volatility. Gomes et al. (2004) link costly external
ﬁnancing to asset prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and states
6the main theorem. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium outcome and the agents’ optimality
conditions in detail. Section 4 presents the perfect investor protection benchmark and Section
5 gives the model’s main predictions on interest rates, equity prices, and returns. Section 6
provides a calibration and supplies quantitative predictions of the model. Section 7 presents
empirical evidence on some of the model’s new predictions. Section 8 concludes. The Appendix
contains technical details and proofs of the propositions in the paper.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by two types of agents, controlling shareholders and minority in-
vestors. Each controlling shareholder operates a ﬁrm. Minority investors are all identical, and
all ﬁrms and their controlling shareholders are assumed to be identical and subject to the same
shocks.6 B o t ht y p e so fa g e n t sh a v ei n ﬁnite horizons and time is continuous. Without loss of
generality, we only need to analyze the decision problems for a representative controlling share-
holder and a representative outside minority investor. Let the total mass of both the controlling
shareholders and minority investors be unity.
Next, we describe the consumption and production sides of the economy, and the objectives
and choice variables of both the controlling shareholder and the minority investors.
2.1 Setup
Production and Investment Opportunities. The ﬁrm is deﬁned by a production tech-
nology. Let K be the ﬁrm’s capital stock process. We assume that K evolves according to
dK(t)=( I (t) − δK (t))dt +  I (t)dZ(t), (1)
where  >0, δ>0 is the depreciation rate, Z (t) is a Brownian motion, I (t) represents the
ﬁrm’s gross investment, and K (0) > 0. Gross investment is given by
I (t)=hK(t) − D(t) − s(t)hK(t). (2)
Firms use capital stock K(t) to produce gross output hK(t) at each point in time t by using
a constant returns to scale technology. Since the focus of our paper is on how agency conﬂicts
aﬀect capital accumulation and equilibrium asset pricing, we simplify the production technology
by focusing on capital. In this setting, we interpret the value of output hK as the revenue net
of labor costs. While our model does not explicitly model labor choice in production, we can
generalize it to account for labor as a factor of production.7 Gross investment I equals gross
6Firms can diﬀer in their initial capital stock, but are otherwise identical.
7Consider a standard constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function AK
υL
1−υ,w h e r eL is the
labor input measured in terms of eﬃciency units and 0 <υ<1.L e tw be the real wage rate. In each period






. The optimal level of labor demand is
7output hK minus the sum of dividends D, and the private beneﬁts extracted by the controlling
shareholder shK.
The capital accumulation process (1) is stochastic with shocks proportional to gross invest-
ment I. Our model follows Keynes (1936) and Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huﬀman (1988)
in assuming that productivity shocks shift the marginal eﬃciency of investment as opposed to
the productivity of existing capital as in more traditional approaches. To make the link to
Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huﬀman (1988) more transparent, consider a discretized version of
(1) over one period
K(t +1 )=( 1− δ)K(t)+I(t)(1+ w(t +1 ) ), (3)
where w(t+1) = Z(t+1)−Z(t) is an innovation given by the standard normal distribution. One
important source of shifts to the marginal eﬃciency of investment identiﬁed in Greenwood et
al. (1997, 2000) is the relative price of the investment good, whereby the aggregate innovation
w(t +1 )aﬀects all ﬁrms equally. Greenwood et al. (1997) provide evidence that shocks to
the marginal eﬃciency of investment account for 60% of postwar-U.S. growth. At the business
cycle frequency, using a calibration exercise, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000) ﬁnd
that shocks to the marginal eﬃciency of investment account for 30% of output ﬂuctuations in the
postwar-U.S. period (see also Christiano and Fisher (2003)). Using an econometric approach,
Fisher (2003) shows that 50%o fU . S .ﬂuctuations are accounted for by shocks to the marginal
eﬃciency of investment.8
It is worth noting that our model speciﬁcation of capital accumulation diﬀers from those
in CIR (1985) and Sundaresan (1984).9 Unlike their models in which capital accumulation
is subject to shocks that are proportional to the capital stock, our model postulates that
capital accumulation is subject to shocks that are proportional to newly invested goods. As a
result, we show later that our model predicts that Tobin’s q is greater than unity, while their
models predict that Tobin’s q equals unity. However, it will become apparent as well that the
dynamics of capital accumulation in our model and in CIR (1985) and Sundaresan (1984) are
observationally equivalent. Note that the result that Tobin’s q is greater than unity arises from
risk aversion on the part of the decision maker and volatility in capital accumulation, rather
than the standard adjustment cost (Abel (1983) and Hayashi (1982)).
proportional to the capital stock and is given by L =( A(1 − υ)/w)
1/υ K. Thus, the revenue function net
of labor payments is (A(1 − υ)/w)
1/υ wυ/(1 − υ)K ≡ hK. To pin down the equilibrium wage rate in this
setting, assume that labor supply in eﬃciency units is proportional to the capital stock, in that ¯ L(t)=l ¯ K (t)
where l>0 and ¯ L and ¯ K are the aggregate counterparts to L and K and are exogenous to each ﬁrm. In
equilibrium, homogeneity of ﬁrms gives ¯ K = K and L = ¯ L (recall that there is a unit mass of ﬁrms). Thus, the
equilibrium wage rate is constant, given by w = A(1 − υ)/l
υ.U s i n gt h ee q u i l i b r i u mw a g er a t ew ec a ne x p r e s s
the productivity parameter h = υAl
1−υ.
8An alternative interpretation of (1) is as a stochastic installation function. Intuitively, how productive new
investments are depends on how well they match with vintages of installed capital. Hence, (1) constitutes an
extension of the deterministic installation function analyzed in Uzawa (1969) and Hayashi (1982).
9Sundaresan (1984) extends CIR into a two-good economy with a Cobb-Douglas production function.
8Next, we discuss the controlling shareholder’s objective and his decision variables. We are
motivated by the large amount of empirical evidence around the world in delegating the ﬁrm’s
decision making to the controlling shareholder.








where C1 denotes the ﬂow of consumption of the controlling shareholder, and the period utility











T h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ei sρ>0,a n dγ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. Throughout
the paper, we use the subscripts “1” and “2” to index variables for the controlling shareholder
and the minority investor, respectively.
The controlling shareholder owns a ﬁxed fraction α<1 of the ﬁrm’s shares. This ownership
share gives him control over the ﬁrm’s investment and payout policies. In real economies,
control rights generally diﬀer from cash ﬂows rights: a fraction of votes higher than that of
cash ﬂow rights can be obtained by owning shares with superior voting rights, by ownership
pyramids, by cross-ownership, or by controlling the board. We refer readers to Bebchuk et al.
(2000) for details on how control rights can diﬀer from cash ﬂow rights.10 For now, we treat α
as constant and nontradable. This assumption is consistent with La Porta et al. (1999) who
argue that the controlling shareholder’s ownership share is extremely stable over time, but is
not needed. In Section 3.3, we allow the controlling shareholder to optimize over his ownership
stake and show that the no-trade outcome is indeed an equilibrium.11
We assume that the controlling shareholder can only invest his wealth in the risk-free asset.
Let W1 denote the controlling shareholder’s tradable wealth. The risk-free asset holdings of
the controlling shareholder are B1 (t)=W1 (t). We assume that the controlling shareholder’s
initial tradable asset holding is zero, in that W1 (0) = 0. Therefore, the controlling shareholder’s
tradable wealth W1 (t) evolves according to
dW1(t)=[ r(t)W1(t)+M (t) − C1(t)]dt, (6)
where M (t) is the ﬂow of goods that the controlling shareholder obtains from the ﬁrm, either
10Giving all the control rights to a controlling shareholder is in line with evidence provided in La Porta et al.
(1999), who document for many countries that the control of ﬁr m si so f t e nh e a v i l yc o n c e n t r a t e di nt h eh a n d so f
af o u n d i n gf a m i l y .
11It is possible to endogenize the decision for the initial share ownership of the controlling shareholder. This
is done in Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) in a static model and Lan and Wang (2004) in a dynamic setting. In
these models weaker investor protection leads to more concentrated ownership, ceteris paribus.
9through dividend payments αD(t) or through private beneﬁts:12
M (t)=αD(t)+s(t)hK(t) − Φ(s(t),hK(t)). (7)
Private beneﬁts of control are modeled as a fraction s(t) of gross output hK (t),w i t hh>0
being the productivity of capital. While we assume that all the controlling shareholder’s private
beneﬁts are pecuniary in nature, it is conceivable that the controlling shareholder may derive
nonpecuniary private beneﬁts as well. For example, the controlling shareholder may simply
enjoy running a larger ﬁrm as in Jensen (1986).13 Expropriation is costly to both the ﬁrm and
the controlling shareholder and, ceteris paribus, for the controlling shareholder pursuing private
beneﬁts, is more costly when investor protection is stronger. If the controlling shareholder





The cost function (8) is increasing and convex in the fraction s of gross output that the control-
ling shareholder diverts for private beneﬁts. The convexity of Φ(s,hK) in s guarantees that
it is more costly to divert increasingly large fractions of private beneﬁts. For the remainder
of the paper, we use the word “stealing” to mean “the pursuit of private beneﬁts by diverting
resources away from the ﬁrm.” The cost function (8) also assumes that the cost of diverting a
given fraction s of cash from a larger ﬁrm is assumed to be higher, because a larger amount shK
of gross output is diverted. That is, ∂Φ(s,hK)/∂K > 0. However, the total cost of stealing the
same level shK is lower for a larger ﬁrm than for a smaller ﬁrm. This can be seen by rewriting
the cost of stealing as Φ(s,hK)=η(shK)
2 /(2hK).
Following Johnson et al. (2000) and La Porta et al. (2002), we interpret the parameter η as
a measure of investor protection.14 Ah i g h e rη implies a larger marginal cost ηshK of diverting
cash for private beneﬁts. In the case of η =0 , there is no cost of diverting cash for private
beneﬁts and the ﬁnancing channel breaks down because investors anticipate no payback from
the ﬁrm after they sink their funds. As a result, ex ante, no investor is willing to invest in the
ﬁrm. In contrast, in the limiting case of η = ∞, the marginal cost of pursuing a marginal unit of
private beneﬁti si n ﬁnity and minority shareholders are thus fully protected from expropriation.
We show later that in this case, in the equilibrium we analyze the incentives of the controlling
shareholder are perfectly aligned with those of the minority investors.
In summary, the objective for the controlling shareholder is to maximize his lifetime util-
ity deﬁn e di n( 4 )a n d( 5 ) ,s u b j e c tt ot h eﬁrm’s capital stock dynamics given in (1)-(2), the
12See Barclay and Holderness (1989) for early work on the empirical evidence in support of private beneﬁts of
control. See also Johnson et al. (2000), Bae et al. (2002), Bertrand et al. (2002), and Dyck and Zingales (2004).
13It is easy to extend our analysis to include these nonpecuniary private beneﬁts. Modeling nonpecuniary
private beneﬁts increases the incentives to overinvest, thus amplifying the mechanisms described in our paper.
14We think of η as capturing the role of laws and law enforcement protection of minority investors. However,
it can be broadly associated with monitoring by outside stakeholders (see, for example, Burkart et al. (1997)).
10controlling shareholder’s wealth accumulation dynamics (6)-(7), the cost function (8) for the
controlling shareholder to pursue his private beneﬁts, and the transversality condition speci-
ﬁed in the Appendix. In solving his optimization problem, the controlling shareholder chooses
{C1 (t),s(t),I(t),K(t),D(t),W 1 (t):t ≥ 0} and takes the equilibrium interest rate process
{r(t):t ≥ 0} as exogenously given.
Let D and K be the dividend and ﬁrm’s capital stock process chosen by the controlling
shareholder. Without loss of generality, we may write both the dividend and capital stock
processes as
dD(t)=µD(t)D(t)dt + σD(t)D(t)dZ(t), (9)
and
dK(t)=µK(t)K (t)dt + σK(t)K (t)dZ(t), (10)
where the drift processes µD and µK and the volatility processes σD and σK a r ec h o s e nb yt h e
controlling shareholder.
Financial Assets. Outside minority investors trade equity shares on the ﬁrm. While the
controlling shareholder chooses the dividend stream, the price of the ﬁrm’s stock is determined
in equilibrium by rational minority investors. We write the equilibrium stock price process as
dP(t)=µP(t)P (t)dt + σP(t)P (t)dZ(t), (11)
where µP and σP are the equilibrium drift and volatility processes for stock prices, respectively.
In addition to ﬁr ms t o c kt r a d e db ym i n o r i t yi n v e s t o r s ,t h e r ei sa l s oar i s k - f r e ea s s e ta v a i l a b l e
in zero net supply. Both minority investors and the controlling shareholder may trade the risk-
free asset. Let r(t) be the short term interest rate paid on this risk-free asset. We determine r,
µP,a n dσP simultaneously in equilibrium in Section 3.
Minority Investors. Minority investors have preferences with the same functional form as
(4) and (5). They jointly own (1 − α) of the ﬁrm’s shares and can sell or buy these shares
in competitive markets with other minority investors at the equilibrium price P (t).T h e yc a n
also invest in the risk-free asset, earning the equilibrium interest rate. Each minority investor’s
optimization problem is a standard consumption-asset allocation problem in the spirit of Merton
(1971). Unlike Merton (1971), however, in our model, both the stock price and the interest rate
are endogenously determined in equilibrium.
Each minority investor accumulates his wealth as follows:
dW2(t)=[ r(t)W2(t) − C2(t)+ω(t)W2 (t)λ(t)]dt + σP(t)ω(t)W2(t)dZ(t), (12)
where λ(t) is the excess stock return inclusive of dividend payments D(t),i nt h a tλ(t) ≡
µP (t)+D(t)/P (t) − r(t),a n dω(t) is the fraction of wealth invested in the ﬁrm’s stock. We
11use the subscript ‘2’ to denote variables chosen by minority investors, when it is necessary to
diﬀerentiate these from the corresponding variables for the controlling shareholder. For example,
in the wealth accumulation equation (12), C2 (t) is the ﬂow of consumption of the minority
investor. The risk-free asset holdings of the minority investors are B2 (t)=( 1− ω(t))W2 (t).
Finally, each minority investor’s initial wealth is W2(0) > 0.
Each minority investor chooses {C2 (t),W 2 (t),ω(t):t ≥ 0} to maximize his lifetime utility
function subject to his wealth accumulation dynamics (12) and the transversality condition
speciﬁed in the Appendix. In solving this problem, the minority investor takes as given the
equilibrium dividend process, the ﬁrm’s stock price, and the interest rate.
2.2 Deﬁnition and Existence of Equilibrium
We are now ready to deﬁne an equilibrium in our economy and state the theorem characterizing
the equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium has the following properties:
(i) {C1 (t),s(t),I(t),K(t),D(t),W 1 (t):t ≥ 0} solve the controlling shareholder’s prob-
lem for the given interest rate r;
(ii) {C2 (t),W 2 (t),ω(t):t ≥ 0} solve the minority investor’s problem for given interest
rate r and stock price and dividend payout stochastic processes {P (t),D(t):t ≥ 0};
(iii) the risk-free asset market clears, in that
B1 (t)+B2 (t)=0 , for all t;
(iv) the stock market clears for minority investors, in that
1 − α = ω(t)W2 (t)/P (t), for all t; and,
(v) the consumption goods market clears, in that
C1 (t)+C2 (t)+I (t)=hK (t) − Φ(s(t),hK(t)), for all t.
The goods market clearing condition states that the total available resource generated in
the economy at time t, hK (t) − Φ(s(t),hK(t)), must be either consumed by the controlling
shareholder or outside investors, or invested in the ﬁrm.
Note that a complication with our model is the presence of heterogeneous investors. In gen-
eral, with heterogeneous investors, agents keep track of the wealth distribution in the economy
(W1 (t),W 2 (t)) in addition to the level of physical capital invested in the ﬁrm K (t).I n o u r
model though this problem is greatly simpliﬁed. First, in all equilibria with a constant interest
rate, the tradable part of the controlling shareholder’s wealth W1 (t) equals zero. Second, the
wealth of the minority investors is proportional to K (t). This feature signiﬁcantly reduces the
dimensionality of the problem from three state variables to one. The theorem introduced below
completely characterizes the equilibrium.
12Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1-5 listed in the Appendix, there exists an equilibrium with
the following properties. The outside minority investors hold no risk-free asset (B2 (t)=0 ),
and therefore hold only stock (ω(t)=1 ). Minority investors’ consumption equals their entitled
dividends:
C2 (t)=( 1− α)D(t).
The controlling shareholder holds no risk-free asset (B1 (t)=0 ). He steals a constant fraction





The controlling shareholder’s consumption C1(t), ﬁrm’s investment I(t),a n dﬁrm’s dividend
payout D(t) are all proportional to the ﬁrm’s capital stock K(t), in that C1 (t)/K (t)=M (t)/K (t)=
m, I(t)/K(t)=i, D(t)/K(t)=d,w h e r e
m = α[(1 + ψ)h − i] > 0, (14)
i =
1+( 1+ψ)h 2





2(γ +1 )  2 ((1 + ψ)h − ρ − δ (1 − γ))




d =( 1 − φ)h − i>0, (16)





The equilibrium dividend process (9), the capital accumulation process (10), and the stock price
process (11) all follow geometric Brownian motions, with the same drift and volatility coeﬃ-
cients; that is,
µD = µK = µP = i − δ, (18)
σD = σK = σP = i , (19)
where i is the constant equilibrium investment-capital ratio given in (15). The equilibrium ﬁrm
value is also proportional to the ﬁrm’s capital stock, in that P(t)=qK(t),w h e r et h ec o e ﬃcient








1 − γ 2i
. (20)
The equilibrium interest rate is given by




γ (γ +1 ). (21)
13The parameter ψ given in (17) summarizes the relevance of investor protection and the
controlling shareholder’s cash ﬂow rights for ﬁrm investment. In particular, ψ is a decreasing
function of the cost of stealing η and of the equity share of the controlling shareholder α.
In equilibrium, ﬁnancial and real variables — price P,d i v i d e n dD, controlling shareholder’s
consumption C1 and wealth W1, ﬁrm investment I, minority investor’s consumption C2,a n d
wealth W2 —are all proportional to the ﬁrm’s capital stock K. That is, in our model, the
economy grows stochastically on a balanced path. In order to deliver such an intuitive and
analytically tractable equilibrium, the following assumptions or properties of the model are
useful: (i) a constant returns to scale production and capital accumulation technology speciﬁed
in (1); (ii) optimal “net” private beneﬁts that are linear in the ﬁrm’s capital stock (arising from
the assumptions that the controlling shareholder’s beneﬁt of stealing is linear in s and his cost
of stealing is quadratic in s); and (iii) the controlling shareholder and the minority investors
have preferences that are homothetic with respect to the ﬁrm’s capital stock. We think the key
intuition and results of our model are robust to various generalizations. Since the economy is
on a balanced growth path, in the remainder of the paper we focus primarily on scaled variables
such as the investment-capital ratio i and the dividend-capital ratio d.
In the next section, we prove Theorem 1, present the derivations of equilibrium prices
and quantities, and highlight the intuition behind the construction of the equilibrium (see the
Appendix for details).
3 Equilibrium Characterization
The natural and direct way to solve for the model’s equilibria in our economy is to solve the
controlling shareholder’s consumption and production decisions and the minority investor’s con-
sumption and asset allocation problem for a general price process and to aggregate the demands
for the stock, the risk-free asset, and the consumption good. However, this approach is techni-
cally quite complicated and analytically not tractable. The controlling shareholder’s optimiza-
tion problem is one with both an incomplete markets consumption-savings problem and a capital
accumulation problem with agency costs. We know from the voluminous consumption-savings
literature that there is no analytically tractable model with constant relative risk aversion util-
ity (Zeldes (1989)). If solving even a subset of such an optimization problem is technically
diﬃcult, we naturally anticipate the joint consumption and production optimization problem
for the controlling shareholder to be intractable, not to mention ﬁnding the equilibrium ﬁxed
point.
Here we adopt the alternative approach by directly conjecturing, and then verifying, the
equilibrium allocations and prices. Speciﬁcally, we conjecture an equilibrium in which the
interest rate is constant and there is no trading of the risk-free asset. We then show that such
an equilibrium satisﬁes all the optimality and market clearing conditions. We start with the
14controlling shareholder’s optimization problem.
3.1 The Controlling Shareholder’s Optimization
We conjecture that the controlling shareholder holds zero risk-free assets in equilibrium, in that
B1 (t)=0for all t ≥ 0. Therefore, his consumption is given by C1 (t)=M(t),w h e r eM(t) is
given in (7).We show that under this conjecture, the rate r that satisﬁes the controlling share-
holder’s optimality condition is equal to the equilibrium interest rate given in (21), presented
in Theorem 1. In order to demonstrate that our conjectured interest rate is the equilibrium
rate, we also need to verify that the optimality condition for the minority investors under the
conjectured interest rate implies zero demand for the risk-free asset. We verify this later in the
section.
Recall that the only tradable asset for the controlling shareholder in this economy is the
risk-free asset. Therefore, together with our conjectured equilibrium demand for the risk-free
asset by the controlling shareholder, we may equivalently write the controlling shareholder’s
optimization problem as the resource allocation problem








subject to the ﬁrm’s capital accumulation dynamics (1)—(2), the cost of stealing (8), and the
transversality condition speciﬁed in the Appendix.


















The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to dividend payout D and cash diversion s are




M−γ (hK − ηshK) −  2IJ00
1 (K)hK = J0
1 (K)hK. (24)
Equation (23) describes how the controlling shareholder chooses the ﬁrm’s dividend and
investment policy. The left side of (23) is the marginal beneﬁt of investment. Increasing the
dividend payout by one unit gives the controlling shareholder an additional α units of dividend
and consumption, thereby increasing utility by M−γα. In contrast, the higher dividend payout
and lower investment incurs the standard loss of indirect utility by the amount J0
1(K) (the
term on the right side of (23)). Unlike the traditional consumption Euler equation, there is an
additional beneﬁt of increasing dividends/reducing investment. Reducing investment decreases
15We verify the solution and provide technical regularity conditions in the appendix.
15the volatility of future marginal utility. The intuition for this risk aversion/volatility eﬀect
comes from (i) the concavity of the value function due to risk aversion (J00
1(K) < 0), and (ii)
the fact that investment increases the volatility of capital accumulation because of shocks to
the marginal eﬃciency of investment (Keynes (1936) and Greenwood et al. (1988)).
W h i l et h e r ea r et w oo p p o s i t ee ﬀects of investment via the controlling shareholder’s value
function, the standard marginal beneﬁt of postponing consumption given by J0
1(K) outweighs
the volatility eﬀect given by  2γi|J00
2(K)|. To understand the intuition, we may rearrange
equation (23) and note that the controlling shareholder optimally sets J0
1(K)− 2γi|J00
2(K)| > 0
to equal M−γα, the marginal utility of consumption. Similar intuition behind the ﬁrst-order
condition (24) for the controlling shareholder’s stealing decision may be obtained.
Solving (23) and (24) gives a constant solution for the stealing function, in that s(t)=φ ≡
(1 − α)/η. Intuitively, stealing is higher when investor protection is worse (lower η)a n dt h e
conﬂicts of interest are larger (smaller α).










where the coeﬃcient A1 is given in the Appendix. We verify this conjecture by solving the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (22) and the associated ﬁrst-order conditions (23)-(24) in the
Appendix. We show that the controlling shareholder’s consumption-capital ratio M (t)/K (t),
the investment-capital ratio I (t)/K (t), and the dividend-capital ratio D(t)/K (t) are all con-
stant and are given by (14), (15), and (16), respectively.
The next proposition states the main properties of investment.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium investment-capital ratio i decreases with investor protection
η and the controlling shareholder’s cash ﬂow rights α,i nt h a tdi/dη < 0 and di/dα < 0,
respectively.
Under weaker investor protection, the controlling shareholder diverts a higher fraction of
gross sales revenue, and thus derives more net private beneﬁts of control (mathematically, φ =
(1−α)/η is higher for lower η). Thus, the rational forward-looking controlling shareholder values
a larger ﬁrm more under weaker investor protection because it can generate even more private
beneﬁts. This eﬀect dominates the volatility eﬀect induced by the existence of shocks to the
marginal eﬃciency of investment (see (23)).16 Therefore, our model predicts that the incentive
to build a larger ﬁrm is stronger under weaker investor protection in spite of higher volatility.
This gives rise to overinvestment relative to the perfect investor protection benchmark.
16Note that (23) indicates that the volatility eﬀect of the controlling shareholder’s value function is smaller than





1 (K) > 0. Moreover, the dependence
of J
0
1(K) on investor protection is also stronger than the dependence of the risk aversion/volatility eﬀect on
investor protection.
16The sensitivity of investment to investment shocks is also aﬀected by the quality of investor
protection. Consider the discrete-time approximation of the capital accumulation equation
given in (3). It is immediate that given K (t − 1), ∂I(t)/∂w(t) > 0 and ∂2I (t)/∂η∂w(t) < 0:
positive shocks to the marginal eﬃciency of investment (w(t) > 0) increase investment more
in the presence of weaker investor protection. Hence, lack of investor protection magniﬁes
the business cycle ﬂuctuations due to investment shocks as highlighted by Keynes (1936) and
Greenwood et al. (1988).
It is worth noting that the controlling shareholder’s incentive to overinvest in our model
derives solely from the private beneﬁts measured in monetary terms. In reality, controlling
shareholders also receive nonpecuniary private beneﬁts in the form of empire building/name
recognition from running larger ﬁrms. The pursuit of such nonpecuniary private beneﬁts exac-
erbates the controlling shareholder’s incentive to overinvest (Jensen (1986)).17 Also, controlling
shareholders are often founding family members that have a desire to pass the ‘empire’ bearing
their own name down to their oﬀsprings (Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003)). Because we
ignore these nonpecuniary private beneﬁts, the model provides a lower estimate of the degree
of overinvestment.
There is a rich supply of empirical evidence on overinvestment and empire building in the
U.S. Harford (1999) documents that U.S. cash-rich ﬁrms are more likely to attempt acquisitions,
but that these acquisitions are value decreasing as measured by either stock return performance
or operating performance.18 Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003) document that, after
controlling for the demand for liquidity, one dollar of cash holdings held by ﬁrms in countries
with poor corporate governance is worth much less to outside shareholders than that held by
ﬁrms in countries with better corporate governance. Gompers et al. (2003) and Philippon
(2004) document that U.S. ﬁrms with low corporate governance have higher investment. The
overinvestment as a consequence of weak corporate governance result ﬁts the evidence well not
only for developed economies, but also many emerging market economies.
Indeed, for emerging market economies, the evidence abounds. In Korea and Thailand,
there is evidence in support of overinvestment before the East Asian crisis. For example,
the huge volume of non-performing loans of 25% of GDP for Korea and 30% of GDP for
Thailand prior to the East Asian crisis in 1997 (Burnside et al. (2001)) is a strong indication
that ﬁrms overinvested.19 China is another example of a country with very large amounts of
nonperforming loans in the banking sector, fruit of a government that tirelessly dumps cash into
17See also Baumol (1959) and Williamson (1964).
18See earlier papers by Lang, Stulz, and Walking (1991), Blanchard, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994),
and Lamont (1997).
19While these local ﬁrms beneﬁtted from government subsidies via, for example, a low borrowing rate, a
lower borrowing rate by itself does not generate a large size of nonperforming loans. Thus, while a subsidized
borrowing channel encourages socially ineﬃcient overinvestment, it does not imply overinvestment from the ﬁrm’s
perspective, given the subsidized cost of funds. Our argument that ﬁrms overinvest because of weak investor
protection remains robust even in the presence of other frictions such as government subsidies.
17ineﬃcient state-owned enterprises. Allen et al. (2004) show that China has had consistently
high growth rates since the beginning of economic reforms in the late 1970s, even though its
legal system is not well developed and law enforcement is poor. Our paper argues that the
incentives for the controlling shareholders to overinvest can at least partly account for China’s
high economic growth despite weak investor protection.20
In our model overinvestment arises because of the pursuit of private beneﬁts by the control-
ling shareholder. This is likely to be a dominant issue for larger ﬁrms. There is a parallel line
of research in corporate ﬁnance that highlights the role of costly external ﬁnancing (Hubbard
(1998)). That literature aims mostly at explaining the behavior of growth and exit of small
ﬁrms, and highlights how ﬁnancing frictions induce ﬁrms to underinvest. Bernanke and Gertler
(1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) provide important contributions to the general equilib-
rium implications of ﬁnancing frictions. We view our research (as well as Dow et al. (2004)) as
complementary to the ﬁnancing friction based approach to business cycle and asset pricing.
We now return to our model’s implication for the controlling shareholder’s problem. We
need to verify that the controlling shareholder’s consumption rule (14) and the equilibrium
interest rate (21) are consistent with the implication that his optimal risk-free asset hold-
ing is indeed zero. This can be done by showing that the interest rate implied by the mar-
ginal utility of the controlling shareholder when C1 (t)=M (t) is the equilibrium rate. The
controlling shareholder’s marginal utility is given by ξ1(t)=e−ρtC1 (t)
−γ. In equilibrium,
ξ1(t)=e−ρt m−γK (t)
−γ. Applying Ito’s lemma gives the following dynamics for ξ1(t):
dξ1(t)
ξ1(t)






γ (γ +1 )dt = −rdt − γi dZ(t) .
In order for ξ1 to be the equilibrium stochastic discount factor, the drift of ξ1 needs to equal
−rξ1. This equilibrium restriction gives the equilibrium interest rate in (21). We refer the
reader to Section 5.1 below for a discussion of the properties of the equilibrium interest rate.
Next, we turn to the minority investor’s optimization problem and his equilibrium security
valuation.
3.2 Minority Investors’ Optimization
Minority investors trade two securities, the stock and the risk-free asset. Each minority investor
faces a standard consumption and asset allocation problem. The minority investor accumulates
his wealth by either investing in the risky asset (ﬁrm asset) or the risk-free asset. His wealth
accumulation process is given by
dW2(t)=[ r(t)W2(t) − C2(t)+ω(t)W2 (t)λ(t)]dt + σPω(t)W2(t)dZ(t),
20A sizable portion of China’s economy is state-owned enterprises. While we do not formally model state-owned
enterprises in this paper, in practice these state-owned enterprises are not much diﬀerent than the ﬁrms with
controlling shareholders as described in our model. The cash ﬂow rights of the managers come from their regular
pay, which in general depends on ﬁrm performance, and the control rights come from government appointment
of the manager. The managers in these ﬁrms are often government oﬃcials or their aﬃliates.
18where λ(t)=µP (t)+D(t)/P (t) − r(t) is the equilibrium risk premium and ω is the fraction
of wealth invested in the risky asset. Under the conjecture that both the equilibrium risk











where A2 is the coeﬃcient to be determined in the Appendix. We obtain the following standard
consumption function and asset allocation solutions:
C2(t)=
µ






















In the proposed equilibrium, the minority investor only holds stock (ω =1 ), holding no risk-free
asset. Hence, the equilibrium excess stock return must satisfy
λ = γσ2
P = γ 2i2. (26)
The ﬁrst equality is the usual result (e.g., Lucas (1978) and Breeden (1979)) that the equity
premium commanded by investors to hold the stock is the product of the price of risk, given
by the investor’s coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, and the quantity of risk, as given by the
inﬁnitesimal variance of the stock return. The last equality states that the standard deviation
of equity returns is proportional to the investment-capital ratio. A higher investment-capital
ratio gives rise to a larger volatility of output and equity prices.
In equilibrium, with zero risk-free asset holdings, the minority investor’s consumption is
C2 (t)=( 1− α)D(t). We apply Ito’s lemma to the minority investor’s marginal utility, ξ2(t)=
e−ρtC2 (t)
−γ = e−ρt [(1 − α)dK (t)]
−γ, to obtain the following dynamics of ξ2(t):
dξ2(t)
ξ2(t)






γ (γ +1 )dt = −rdt − γi dZ(t) . (27)
Because ξ2 is the equilibrium stochastic discount factor, the drift of ξ2 needs to equal −rξ2,
where r is the equilibrium interest rate. This equilibrium restriction and (27) together give
the equilibrium interest rate in (21). Importantly, the implied equilibrium interest rate by the
controlling shareholder’s ξ1 and the minority investor’s ξ2 are equal. We therefore verify that,
like the controlling shareholder, minority investors ﬁnd it optimal not to trade the risk-free
asset at the equilibrium interest rate (21).
It remains to be shown that the price process (11), appropriately constructed, is an equilib-
rium process for equity trading among minority investors, and generates a constant excess stock
return. Using the minority investor’s marginal utility, we obtain the stock’s price per share by
19dividing the discounted value of total dividends paid to minority investors by the number of












where Tobin’s q,a l s ok n o w na st h eﬁrm’s market-to-book value, is given by (20). Note that
because the relative price of capital is one, the replacement cost of the ﬁrm’s capital is just
K (t).
Tobin’s q is positive for 1− 2iγ > 0, which holds under Assumption 5. With constant q and
dividend-capital ratio d, in equilibrium it is straightforward to show that the drift coeﬃcients
for dividend, stock price, and capital stock are all the same, that is µD = µP = µK = i−δ,a n d
the volatility coeﬃcients for dividend, stock price, and capital stock are also the same, that is
σD = σP = σK =  i. A constant risk premium λ is an immediate implication of constant µP,
constant dividend-capital ratio d, and constant equilibrium risk-free interest rate.
3.3 Equity Trading Between the Controlling Shareholder and Minority In-
vestors
So far we exogenously assume that the controlling shareholder cannot trade equity with the
minority investors. In this section, we extend our model by allowing both the controlling
shareholder and outside minority investors to trade equity. We show that in equilibrium both
the controlling shareholder and outside minority investors rationally choose not to trade with
each other. The key in our analysis is to identify a free rider situation similar to the free rider
problem identiﬁed in Grossman and Hart (1980) in the corporate takeover context. Lan and
Wang (2004) propose such a free rider argument between a risk-neutral controlling shareholder
and risk-neutral outside minority investors. Here, we apply the free rider argument to risk-
averse agents.21
The key insight behind our proof for the no-trade result is that the controlling shareholder is
unable to enjoy any surplus generated from increasing the ﬁrm’s value (via a more concentrated
ownership structure). The crucial assumption is that the controlling shareholder cannot trade
anonymously. The inability to trade anonymously is realistic. For example, in almost all
countries, insiders need to ﬁle a report before selling or buying their own ﬁrm’s shares. We now
provide more details for the no-trade result, leaving a formal proof to the Appendix.
Let α be the controlling shareholder’s current ownership in the ﬁrm. Suppose the controlling
shareholder considers the possibility of increasing his ownership from α to α0,i fi ti si nh i s
interest to do so. With a slight abuse of notation, let Pα0 and Pα denote the equilibrium equity
price (resulting from competitive trading), when the controlling shareholder’s ownership is α0
and α, respectively. Because higher ownership concentration gives better incentive alignment,
21To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that identiﬁes a free rider problem with risk-averse
agents.
20investors rationally anticipate Pα0 >P α,f o rα0 >α(see equation (28) above and Proposition
3 below). Obviously, the controlling shareholder will not buy any shares at prices above Pα0.
Moreover, we show in the Appendix that the most he is willing to pay is Pα.
Let us turn to the minority investor’s decision problem. Consider the decision of a minority
investor j facing a buy order from the controlling shareholder at price Pα.I fs u ﬃcient shares are
tendered to the controlling shareholder by other minority investors at any acceptable price to the
controlling shareholder (which is obviously lower than Pα0), then the deal will go through even if
investor j does not sell. As a result, investor j enjoys a price appreciation and obtains a higher
v a l u a t i o nb yf r e er i d i n go no t h e ri n v e s t o r s .B e c a u s ee a c hm i n o r i t yi n v e s t o ri si n ﬁnitesimal and
therefore not a pivotal decision maker, the free rider incentive implies no trade in equilibrium.22
Before delving into the details on the relation between investor protection and asset returns,
we ﬁrst analyze equilibrium for the no agency cost setting. This neoclassical setting (with no
agency cost) serves naturally as the benchmark against which we may quantify the eﬀect of
imperfect investor protection on asset prices and returns.
4 Benchmark: Perfect Investor Protection
This section summarizes the main results on both the real and ﬁnancial sides of an economy
under perfect investor protection.
When investor protection is perfect, the cost of diverting resources away from the ﬁrm is
inﬁnity, even if the controlling shareholder diverts a negligible fraction of the ﬁrm’s resources.
Therefore, the controlling shareholder rationally decides not to pursue any private beneﬁts and
maximizes ﬁrm value using the unique discount factor in the economy. That is, there are no
conﬂicts of interest between the controlling shareholder and the outside minority investors. Our
model is then essentially a neoclassical production-based asset pricing model similar to Cox,
Ingersoll, and Ross (CIR) (1985). We highlight the main diﬀerences between our model and
the CIR model later in this section.
The controlling shareholder chooses the ﬁrst-best investment level I∗(t)=i∗K∗(t),w h e r e
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Starred variables (“∗”) denote equilibrium values of the variables under perfect investor protec-
tion. From Proposition 1 we know that there is overinvestment under weak investor protection,
22The free rider argument developed here breaks down if the controlling shareholder, instead of buying a
small number of shares, oﬀers to buy the remaining outstanding shares. In this case, however, suppose that the
controlling shareholder ﬁnances his acquisition by borrowing in the bond market. In a more general framework
that incorporates weak investor protection in the bond market, these bonds would be bought at a premium
possibly large enough to oﬀset the gain from buying all the shares from the minority investors, in which case no
trade would occur. We thank John Long for making this point.
21i∗ <i .
Tobin’s q under this ﬁrst-best benchmark is given by
q∗ =
1
1 −  2γi∗ ≥ 1. (30)
Before analyzing the stochastic case ( >0), we brieﬂy sketch the model’s prediction when
capital accumulation is deterministic (  =0 ). It is easy to show that without volatility in
the capital accumulation equation (1), Tobin’s q is equal to unity.23 This is implied by no
arbitrage when both capital accumulation is deterministic and incurs no adjustment cost and
the production function has the constant returns to scale property.
The key prediction of our model on the real side under perfect investor protection is that
Tobin’s q is larger than unity if capital accumulation is subject to shocks ( >0). That is, the
value of installed capital is larger than that of to-be-installed capital. The intuition is as follows.
The shocks to the marginal eﬃciency of investment are described by the aggregate shock ∆Z(t).
The eﬀect of these shocks depends on the level of investment. Naturally, this production risk
is systematic and thus must be priced in equilibrium. As a result, risk-averse investors view it
as costly to adjust capital in equilibrium. This, in turn, drives a wedge between the price of
uninstalled capital and the price of installed capital, and gives rise to a Tobin’s q larger than
unity.
One important diﬀerence between our model and the CIR model is the implication on Tobin’s
q. In the CIR model, the production technology is also constant returns to scale. However,
in their model, the volatility of output does not depend on the level of investment. In other
words, their model does not capture shocks to the marginal eﬃciency of investment. The price
of capital in the CIR model is equal to unity. Dow et al. (2004) incorporate the manager’s
empire building incentive into the neoclassical production-based asset pricing framework such
as the CIR model, retaining the feature that the price of capital is equal to unity.
Because outside minority investors and the controlling shareholder have the same utility
functions, and markets are eﬀectively complete in the perfect investor protection case, we
naturally expect that both the controlling shareholder and outside minority investors hold
no risk-free asset in equilibrium, investing all of their wealth in the risky asset in equilibrium.
The minority investors’ and the controlling shareholder’s consumption plans are equal to their
respective entitled dividends, in that C∗
2 (t)=( 1− α)D∗ (t), C∗
1 (t)=αD∗ (t),a n dD∗ (t)=
d∗K∗ (t),w i t ht h eﬁrst-best dividend-capital ratio given by d∗ = h − i∗.
The equilibrium interest rate under perfect investor protection, r∗, is given by (21), which
is associated with the ﬁrst-best investment-capital ratio i∗. Equation (21) indicates that the
interest rate r∗ is constant and is determined by the following three components: (i)t h ei n -
vestor’s subjective discount rate ρ,( ii) the net investment-capital ratio (i − δ), and (iii)t h e
23The ﬁrst-best investment-capital ratio when   =0is given by i
∗ =[ h − ρ − δ(1 − γ)]/γ,b ya p p l y i n g
L’Hôpital’s rule to (29).
22precautionary saving motive. In a risk-neutral world, the interest rate must equal the sub-
jective discount rate in order to clear the market. This explains the ﬁrst term. The second
term captures the economic growth eﬀect on the interest rate. A higher net investment-capital
ratio (i − δ) implies that more resources are available for consumption in the future and thus
raises demand for current consumption relative to future consumption. To clear the market,
t h ei n t e r e s tr a t em u s ti n c r e a s e . T h i se ﬀect is stronger when the agent is less willing to sub-
stitute consumption intertemporally, which corresponds to a lower elasticity of intertemporal
substitution 1/γ.24 The third term captures the precautionary savings eﬀect on interest rate
determination. A high net investment-capital ratio increases the riskiness of the ﬁrm’s cash
ﬂows, and thus makes agents more willing to save. This preference for precautionary savings
reduces current demand for consumption and lowers the interest rate, ceteris paribus.
In this benchmark case, the equilibrium stock price P∗ is given by the geometric Brownian
motion (11) with drift µ∗
P = i∗ − δ and volatility σ∗
P = i∗ .
Next, we analyze how diﬀerent degrees of investor protection aﬀect asset prices and returns.
5 Equilibrium Asset Returns
We ﬁrst analyze the equilibrium interest rate and then turn to the stock return.
5.1 Risk-Free Rate
The next proposition relates the interest rate under imperfect investor protection to that of the
benchmark case.
Proposition 2 Worse investor protection or a lower share of equity held by the controlling
shareholder are associated with a higher risk-free interest rate if and only if 1 >  2 (γ +1 )i.
Speciﬁcally, the interest rate in an economy with imperfect investor protection is higher than
that under perfect investor protection if and only if 1 >  2 (γ +1 )i.
Changes in the degree of investor protection produce two opposing eﬀects on the equilibrium
interest rate. Both eﬀects result from investment being higher under weaker investor protection.
First, because of the eﬀect of economic growth on the interest rate, higher investment implies
larger output in the future and intertemporal consumption smoothing makes the agent willing
to ﬁnance his current consumption by borrowing. This leads to a higher current equilibrium
interest rate. Second, higher investment makes capital accumulation more volatile and implies
a stronger precautionary saving eﬀect, which in turn pushes down the current equilibrium
24In expected utility framework, elasticity of intertemporal substitution is equal to the inverse of the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion. In a recursive utility as an Epstein-Zin utility, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
and the coeﬃcient of risk aversion may be partially disentangled. In such recursive utility framework, the
coeﬃcient for the growth-investment term is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
23interest rate to clear the market, ceteris paribus. The proposition illustrates that the growth
eﬀect dominates the precautionary eﬀect if and only if 1 >  2 (γ +1 )i, that is, in the region in
which the equilibrium interest rate increases with the investment-capital ratio. As demonstrated
in the Appendix this condition is satisﬁed for suﬃciently low  , h,o rψ, and holds in all our
calibrations below. It implies that the growth eﬀect dominates and thus interest rates are
higher under weaker investor protection. The cross-country interest rate data on 11 developed
countries in Campbell (2003) suggests that civil law countries, those with weaker investor
protection, have higher interest rates than common law countries. The average interest rate
on his sample of common law countries is 1.89%, statistically smaller than the 2.35% average
interest rate on his sample of civil law countries.
We now turn to equilibrium valuation from both the controlling shareholder’s and the mi-
nority investor’s perspectives.
5.2 Firm Valuation and Returns
Controlling Shareholder’s Shadow Equity Valuation. Even though the controlling share-
holder cannot trade ﬁrm equity with outside minority investors, the controlling shareholder
nonetheless has a shadow value for equity. Let ˆ P(t) denote this shadow price of equity for the












1 −  2iγ
K (t).
The equilibrium shadow market-to-book value of the ﬁrm to the controlling shareholder, or
shadow Tobin’s q, is therefore given by
ˆ q =
1
1 −  2iγ
.
We note that the shadow value ˆ q is higher than q∗, the Tobin’s q under perfect investor
protection. The intuition is as follows. The controlling shareholder distorts the capital accu-
mulation decision in pursuit of his private beneﬁts and thus obtains a shadow value for the ﬁrm
higher than q∗. By revealed preference, the controlling shareholder could set the investment-
capital ratio to i∗ and steal nothing s =0 , which would imply ˆ q = q = q∗. Therefore, by
choosing s>0, the controlling shareholder’s decisions (i>i ∗) must imply that his valuation
is ˆ q>q ∗. Alternatively, we note that ˆ q>q ∗ is solely attributed to the overinvestment re-
sult (i>i ∗). Intuitively, overinvestment induces a larger (undiversiﬁable) risk associated with
shocks to the marginal eﬃciency of investment (Greenwood et al. (1988) and Greenwood et
al. (1997)). Therefore, a risk-averse controlling shareholder values the existing capital stock in
terms of to-be-installed capital by an even greater amount under weaker investor protection.
This induces a higher shadow Tobin’s q (ˆ q) for the controlling shareholder under weaker investor
protection. We turn next to the minority investor’s valuation.
24Minority Investors’ Valuation. Theorem 1 shows that the equilibrium price for ﬁrm equity
is proportional to the capital stock and is given by P(t)=qK(t),w h e r eq measures Tobin’s
q also known as the market-to-book ratio. The next proposition characterizes the monotonic
relationship between q and investor protection.
Proposition 3 Tobin’s q increases with investor protection, in that dq/dη > 0,a n di n c r e a s e s
with the controlling shareholder’s cash ﬂow rights, in that dq/dα > 0.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that the model is consistent with the evidence oﬀered in La
Porta et al. (2002), Gompers et al. (2003), and Doidge et al. (2004) on the relationship
between ﬁrm value and investor protection. The model also predicts that ﬁrm value increases
with the controlling shareholder’s ownership α. This incentive alignment eﬀect due to higher
cash ﬂow rights is consistent with empirical evidence in Claessens et al. (2002) on ﬁrm value and
cash ﬂow ownership, and with the evidence for Korea in Baek et al. (2004), which documents
that non-chaebol ﬁrms experienced a smaller reduction in their share value during the East
Asian crisis.
Firm value increases with the degree of investor protection, because under weaker investor
protection, the controlling shareholder extracts more private beneﬁts today and distorts invest-
ment in order to pursue higher private beneﬁts in the future. La Porta et al. (2002) and Shleifer
and Wolfenzon (2002) explain lower Tobin’s q under worse investor protection via the private
beneﬁts argument in a static setting with risk-neutral agents. Lan and Wang (2004) extend the
analysis to a dynamic equilibrium analysis with risk-neutral entrepreneurs and outside minority
investors. Ours is the ﬁrst paper to explain this empirical evidence while computing ﬁrm value
in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium asset pricing model with risk-averse agents.
We next turn to the dividend yield. Let y be the equilibrium dividend yield, in that
y = D/P = d/q. Recall that the equilibrium dividend D follows a geometric Brownian motion
with a constant drift rate µD and volatility σD. Adjusting for risk, the dynamics of the dividend
process (under the risk-neutral probability measure) are given by25
dD(t)=gD(t)dt + σDD(t)d ˜ Z(t), (31)
where ˜ Z(t) is the Brownian motion under the risk-neutral probability measure and g is the
risk-adjusted growth rate of the dividend:
g = µD − λ = µD − γσ2
D = i − δ − γi2 2. (32)
25Using Girsanov’s theorem, the dynamics of the Brownian motion under the risk-neutral probability measure
are given by
d ˜ Z(t)=dZ(t)+( λ/σD)dt.

















We thus have the following expression for the dividend yield:









using the equilibrium interest rate formula (21).
The pricing formula (33) reminds us of the Gordon dividend growth model, which is widely
taught in the MBA classrooms. Unlike the standard Gordon model, both the interest rate
and the risk-adjusted growth rate are endogenous equilibrium quantities. The risk-adjusted
dividend growth rate g is lower than the expected dividend growth rate µD = i − δ.T h i s
diﬀerence µD − g = γ 2i2 depends on the degree of risk aversion and ﬁrm investment. While
we interpret the dividend yield as the diﬀerence between r and risk-adjusted dividend growth
rate g, we may also write the dividend yield y as y =( r + λ) − µD,w h e r e(r + λ) is the total
expected rate of return on ﬁrm value and µD is the expected dividend growth rate.
The next proposition summarizes the main predictions of our model on the dividend yield.
Proposition 4 The dividend yield decreases (increases) with the degree of investor protection
if and only if γ>1 (γ<1).
The key step behind Proposition 4 derives from the result that there is more overinvestment















Therefore, one immediately notes that the eﬀect of investor protection on the dividend yield
depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.27 F i r s t ,i nt h ec a s ei nw h i c hi n v e s t o r s
have logarithmic utility, the dividend yield is equal to the investors’ subjective discount rate
ρ, directly implied by (34). This reﬂects the myopic nature of logarithmic utility investors.
From (33), when γ>1,t h ee ﬀect of investor protection on the interest rate r is stronger than
the eﬀect on the risk-adjusted growth rate g. As a result, the dividend yield decreases with
investor protection. This result can also be explained using the properties of consumption.
When γ>1, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than unity and the income eﬀect
is stronger than the substitution eﬀect. The result of lower interest rates associated with better
investor protection is to motivate a decrease in current consumption (netting the income and
26The ﬁrst equality in (33) is the standard asset pricing equation. The second equality uses the pricing formula
under the risk-neutral probability measure and ˜ E denotes the expectation under the risk-neutral probability
measure. The last equality uses the dividend dynamics (31) under the risk-neutral probability measure.
27The elasticity is equal to the inverse of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
26substitution eﬀects) and thus of the dividend yield.28 In practice, whether γ is interpreted as the
risk aversion coeﬃcient or the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, empirical
estimates of γ are in general larger than unity.29 Therefore, with a plausible estimate of γ>1,
the model predicts a higher dividend yield in countries with weaker investor protection and
higher interest rates.
The next proposition gives our main results on equilibrium returns.
Proposition 5 Expected return inclusive of dividends, return volatility σP, and risk premium
λ, all decrease in investor protection η and ownership α.
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. Weaker investor protection implies
increased agency conﬂicts and gives the controlling shareholder a greater incentive to overinvest,
as discussed earlier. The dividend and stock price, which in general equilibrium are shown
to be proportional to the aggregate capital stock, not only grow faster, but are also more
volatile. The covariation between the stock return (dividend yield plus capital gains) and
consumption is thus greater in countries with weaker investor protection. Therefore, weaker
investor protection increases the riskiness of the stock to minority investors and thus implies a
higher risk premium.30 A simple way to write the equity risk premium is by noting the relation
λ = γσ2
P = γ 2i2 = −(−1) × (γ i) × ( i) ,
where the last equality details the standard argument that the risk premium is given by the
minus of the product of the following three items: (i) the instantaneous correlation between
the stochastic discount factor and the instantaneous stock return, which is minus unity (only
one (aggregate) shock in the model), (ii) the market price of risk (the Sharpe ratio), γ i,a n d
(iii) the volatility of instantaneous stock returns,  i.
There is evidence in support of Proposition 5. Hail and Leuz (2004) ﬁnd that countries
with strong securities regulation and enforcement mechanisms exhibit lower levels of cost of
capital than countries with weak legal institutions. Daouk, Lee, and Ng (2004) create an index
of capital market governance that captures diﬀerences in insider trading laws, short-selling
restrictions, and earnings opacity. They model excess equity returns using an international
capital asset market model that allows for varying degrees of ﬁnancial integration. Consistent
with Proposition 5, they show that improvements in their index of capital market governance
are associated with lower equity risk premia.
The cross-country data in Campbell (2003) indicates that civil law countries, those with
weaker investor protection, have higher excess equity returns than common law countries. The
28Note that in equilibrium C2/W2 = y.
29See Hansen and Singleton (1982), for example.
30As indicated in Proposition 4, not all of the excess returns come necessarily from higher capital accumulation
(as a result of overinvestment) and subsequent price appreciation. For plausible parameter values (γ>1), the
dividend yield is also higher under weaker investor protection.
27average excess equity return on his sample of common law countries is 4.12%, smaller than the
6.97% average excess equity return on his sample of civil law countries.
Harvey (1995), Bekaert and Harvey (1997), and Bekaert and Urias (1999) show that emerg-
ing markets display higher volatility of returns and larger equity risk premia. Bekaert and
Harvey (1997) correlate their estimated conditional stock return volatilities with ﬁnancial, mi-
crostructure, and macroeconomic variables and ﬁnd some evidence that countries with lower
country credit ratings, as measured by Institutional Investor, have higher volatility. Erb et al.
(1996) show that expected returns, as well as volatility, are higher when country credit risk
is higher. Since emerging market economies and countries with worse credit ratings have on
average weaker corporate governance, this empirical evidence is consistent with our theory.
The minority investors in our model behave much like the investors in a traditional consump-
tion capital asset pricing model augmented to include a production sector. However, minority
investors are not the ones choosing the investment-capital ratio, and further, they are faced with
too much capital accumulation and demand for savings. These predictions diﬀer from produc-
tion models in which the minority investors are the ones choosing the capital accumulation
path and they can use the investment-capital ratio to smooth out business cycle ﬂuctuations.
In these other models, as in the benchmark model described above, the volatility of dividends is
smaller and the economy’s risk premium is smaller. Hence, our model here generates a higher
risk premium than do traditional neoclassical asset pricing models with production such as the
CIR (1985) model.
Because ﬁrm equity is priced by outside minority investors, the relevant consumption data
to feed into the risk premium calculations is that of minority investors and not aggregate con-
sumption. Our approach is thus similar to Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) who focus on consumption
data of a smaller sample of stockholders. Relative to Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), our model sug-
gests computing the risk premium directly by working with production (investment) data and
avoiding consumer data, which generally produces very noisy estimates. Speciﬁcally, our model
predicts that for equal risk aversion γ and volatility   parameters, the percentage diﬀerence
in equity premia between any two countries should be of the same order of magnitude as the
percentage diﬀerence in squared investment-capital ratios. We pursue two related predictions
b e l o wi nS e c t i o n7 .
Naturally, the disagreement in valuation between the controlling shareholder and outside
minority investors approaches zero as investor protection increases because q → q∗ and ˆ q → q∗
as η →∞ . In the case of perfect investor protection, the controlling shareholder is homogeneous
to the minority investors and investment and dividend policies chosen by the former coincide
with what the later would do.
Despite the disagreement between minority investors and the controlling shareholder on
the ﬁrm’s market-to-book value under imperfect investor protection, they agree on expected
28returns. The instantaneous shadow return to the controlling shareholder is








dt +  idZ (t)=( µP + y)dt + σP dZ (t).
Therefore, the instantaneous shadow return is equal to µP + y, the expected stock return
(including the dividend component) for outside minority investors. Intuitively, the economy
grows stochastically on a balanced path. Both the controlling shareholder and outside minority
investors share the same marginal valuation.
While we focus here on equity prices and returns and the risk-free rate, our model can be
used to price ﬁnancial securities with any given feature of cash ﬂows, including equity options
and futures. This is due to the fact that our model is eﬀectively one of complete markets with
an endogenously determined stochastic discount factor.
We now take our model’s implications and quantify the economic signiﬁcance of imperfect
investor protection on asset returns and the utility costs.
6 Quantitative Predictions
Our model is quite parsimonious in that it has only seven parameters from both the production
and investor sides of the economy. The choice of parameter values is determined in one of two
ways. Some parameters are obtained by direct measurements conducted in other studies. These
include the risk aversion coeﬃcient γ, the depreciation rate δ, the rate of time preference ρ,
and the equity share of the controlling shareholder α. The remaining three parameters (η, ,h)
are selected so that the model matches three relevant moments in the data.
6.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model for the United States and South Korea. Starting with the ﬁrst set of
parameters, we choose the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion to be 5. The depreciation rate
is set to an annual value of 0.07, and the subjective discount rate is set to ρ =0 .01 based on
empirical estimation results such as those reported in Hansen and Singleton (1982). We choose
the share of ﬁrm ownership held by the controlling shareholders to be α =0 .08 for the U.S. and
α =0 .39 for Korea from Dahlquist et al. (2003), to represent the percentage of overall market
capitalization that is closely held.
Turning now to the second set of parameters, we calibrate the investor protection parameter
η, the volatility parameter  , and the productivity parameter h so that the model matches the
following three moments of the data: (i) the real interest rate, (ii) the standard deviation of
stock returns, and (iii) the ratio of private beneﬁts to ﬁrm equity value. For the U.S. real interest
rate, we use 0.9% from Campbell (2003). We use 3.7% for the real interest rate for Korea, which
is obtained as the average annual real prime lending rate during 1980-2000 using data from the
29World Bank World Development Indicators database. We set the annual standard deviation of
stock returns in the US to be at 15.6% from Campbell (2003). For South Korea, we set the
annual stock return volatility to be 30%, based on monthly volatility.31 Finally, the ratio of
private beneﬁts to ﬁrm equity value (in the model, equal to (ˆ q − q)/q) is taken to be 2%f o rt h e
U.S. and 15.7%f o rK o r e a . 32 The resulting calibrated parameters are ( ,η,h)=( .28,2510,.081)
for the U.S. and ( ,η,h)=( .47,24.3,.115) for Korea. For both countries these parameters
imply that the model matches all three moments exactly.
The calibrated model implies a stealing fraction (φ =( 1 − α)/η)o f0.04%f o rt h eU . S .
and 2.5% for Korea —over sixty times higher than that of the U.S. The ﬂow cost of stealing as
a fraction of gross output (Φ(s,hK)/hK =( 1− α)
2 /2η)i sq u i t es m a l l :0.02%f o rt h eU . S .
and 0.8% for Korea. One measure of agency cost that summarizes both the beneﬁta n dt h e
cost of stealing for the controlling shareholder is ψ =( 1− α)
2 /(2αη), the net private beneﬁts
of control per unit of ownership. For the U.S. and Korea, we have ψ =0 .2%a n dψ =2 %,
respectively. The investment-capital ratios obtained in the calibrated model are 7.1% for the
U.S. and 8% for Korea, and Tobin’s q is 1.01 for the US and 0.95 for Korea.
6.2 Results
We now report numerical results for Tobin’s q and the risk premium. Each ﬁgure below contains
four plots. The top plots contain the results for the U.S. and the bottom plots contain the results
for South Korea. The two left plots give the model’s comparative statics with respect to the
degree of investor protection (reported as changes in the optimal stealing fraction φ), whereas
the two plots on the right describe the comparative statics with respect to the equity share of
the controlling shareholder.
Consider the market valuation of minority investors and the implied market-to-book value.
Figure 1 displays the model’s comparative statics on (q∗ − q)/q, the size of the stock market
revaluation if moving to an otherwise identical world of perfect investor protection.Figure 1
shows that Tobin’s q increases in investor protection as proved in Proposition 3. A suﬃciently
low stealing fraction (i.e., large η) or large α takes Tobin’s q closer to the benchmark case.
With our calibrated baseline parameters, the U.S. stock market revaluation of moving to perfect
investor protection is 2% and for Korea the revaluation is 15.6%. This conﬁrms that agency
conﬂicts have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on security prices.
31We use the fact that the monthly stock return volatility is about twice larger than that of the U.S. We do
not use the annual stock return volatility directly because of data limitation. For example, the annual stock
return volatility reported in the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) country index for Korea is based
on only ten years of data.
32Dyck and Zingales (2004) estimate that the private beneﬁt sa saf r a c t i o no fﬁrm value are 1.8%f o rt h eU . S .
and 15.7% for Korea, respectively. Barclay and Holderness (1989) estimate that private beneﬁts for the U.S. are
4%o fﬁrm value.
30[Figure 1 here.]
Next we quantify the eﬀect of investor protection on the risk premium. Recall that Propo-
sition 5 shows that the benchmark case of perfect investor protection displays a smaller risk
premium than the imperfect investor protection case. Here, we investigate the quantitative
signiﬁcance of the mechanism. Figure 2 plots (λ − λ∗)/λ against the stealing fraction (as η
changes) and the ownership share α (note that in the two plots on the right, the benchmark
level of the risk premium also changes with α). The ratio (λ − λ∗)/λ gives the fraction of the
risk premium that is attributed to weak investor protection. The ﬁgure indicates that 0.1%o f
the U.S.’s risk premium is due to weak investor protection, but for South Korea, 1.1%o fi t s
equity premium in the stock market is due to low levels of corporate governance. Since our
model does not incorporate the controlling shareholders’ nonpecuniary incentives to overinvest
(such as Jensen’s empire building managers), our model thus likely provides a lower estimate
on the eﬀect of investor protection on the risk premium. Suppose that the stealing fraction φ is
1% in the US, then roughly 2.6% of the U.S. risk premium would be explained by low corporate
governance.
[Figure 2 here.]
The objective of this paper is to study the eﬀect of imperfect investor protection on asset
pricing and wealth redistribution, we intentionally choose a minimalist approach in setting up
the model. Therefore, we construct an investment-based asset pricing model with separation
of ownership and control by building on the investor protection literature, with minimal devi-
ation from the classical CIR model. One important and analytically convenient implication of
our minimalist approach is that the equilibrium marginal rate of substitution (the stochastic
discount factor) is observationally equivalent to the marginal rate of substitution in a repre-
sentative agent endowment economy (Lucas (1978)). Therefore, the level of the risk premium
under our proposed baseline calibration is small, though as illustrated above, higher than in
the absence of agency conﬂicts.
So far, we focus on the asset pricing implications of weak investor protection. We next turn
to both the aggregate and redistribution eﬀects of weak investor protection for the economy.
6.3 The Cost of Imperfect Investor Protection
The equilibrium in our model is not socially optimal because the controlling shareholder spends
resources wastefully in order to pursue his private beneﬁts. The resources spent are not enjoyed
by any party in the society and hence constitute a deadweight loss. Moreover, investment is
distorted as well. One approach to quantify the net eﬀect of lacking investor protection on the
31aggregate economy is to use a welfare criterion that weights the utility levels of the controlling
shareholder and outside shareholders. However, this welfare approach is rather subjective. We
instead calculate how much the controlling shareholder gains from maintaining the status quo
and how much outside shareholders are willing to pay for improving investor protection. These
two measures jointly quantify the wealth redistribution from outside investors to the controlling
shareholders, and do not require us to make any subjective assumptions on welfare weights.
We measure wealth redistribution eﬀects by computing measures of equivalent variations
for both outside investors and the controlling shareholders. For minority investors, we ask what
fraction of personal wealth is each investor willing to give up for a permanent improvement of
investor protection from the current level η to the benchmark (ﬁrst-best) level of η = ∞.W h i l e
the outside investors lose from lacking strong investor protection, the controlling shareholder
beneﬁts from imperfect investor protection. For controlling shareholders, we ask what fraction
of personal wealth is each controlling shareholder to be paid in order to voluntarily give up the
status quo and move to the benchmark level of investor protection η = ∞.
Let (1 − ζ2) denote the fraction of wealth that a minority investor is willing to give up for
such a permanent increase in the quality of investor protection. Then, the minority investor is
indiﬀerent if and only if the following equality holds:
J∗
2(ζ2W0)=J2(W0),
where J2 is the minority investor’s value function and W0 is some initial wealth level.33 Since
the minority investor’s wealth W is proportional to the ﬁrm’s capital stock K in equilibrium,
(1 − ζ2) is also the fraction of the capital stock that the minority investors own and are willing
to give up in exchange for better investor protection. Using the value function formula given in







We now turn to the controlling shareholder’s perspective. Let (ζ1 − 1) denote the additional
fraction of wealth that the controlling shareholder needs under perfect investor protection (η =
∞) in order for him to achieve the same level of utility that he has under the status quo. For





2 to denote the corresponding value function for minority investors under perfect investor protection.
34By applying L’Hopital’s rule to (35) around γ =1 , we obtain the formula for ζ2 for logarithmic utility. With































Proposition 6 The minority investors’ utility cost is higher under weaker investor protection,
in that dζ2/dη > 0. The controlling shareholder’s utility gain is higher with weaker investor
protection, dζ1/dη < 0. Naturally, for any η<∞, 0 <ζ 2 < 1 <ζ 1.
Figure 3 plots (ζ1 − 1) and (1 − ζ2) against various levels of the optimal stealing fraction
(which varies as investor protection η varies), holding ownership ﬁx e di ne a c ho ft h et w ol e f tp a n -
els, and plots (ζ1 − 1) and (1 − ζ2) against the controlling shareholder’s ownership α, holding
investor protection η ﬁx e di nt h ep l o t so nt h er i g h t .
The results are quite striking. Minority investors are willing to give up a substantial part of
their own wealth for stronger investor protection. This is true even for the U.S. whose minority
investors are willing to give up 1% of their wealth to move to perfect investor protection. In
Korea, minority investors are willing to give up 10% of their wealth to realize perfect investor
protection.
In our model, the controlling shareholder distorts ﬁrm value through both outright stealing
and overinvestment. The controlling shareholder’s incentive to overinvest derives solely from his
expectation of higher future private beneﬁts if future ﬁrm size is larger. Hence, there would be
no overinvestment if there were no stealing. We can nonetheless quantify the separate eﬀects
of stealing and overinvestment on the welfare costs of low investor protection for minority
investors by decomposing ζ2 into a component that measures only the investment distortion
(by setting the stealing fraction to zero and the investment-capital ratio to that given in (15)),
and the residual. Based on this metric, investment distortions alone explain 70% of the utility
cost measured by ζ2 in the U.S. and 25% in Korea. The investment distortion plays a more
important role compared to the stealing distortion in the U.S. than in Korea. This diﬀerence
arises because the equilibrium stealing rate in Korea is much larger than that in the U.S., but
the investment rate increases less than proportionally to the equilibrium stealing rate.
These beneﬁts of increasing investor protection are economically large and derive mostly
from the fact that investor protection distorts the expected growth rate of the economy. We
argue that our model is likely to provide a conservative estimate on the utility cost because
we only consider the controlling shareholders’ pecuniary components of private beneﬁts. In
general, controlling shareholders have a preference for a larger ﬁrm, ceteris paribus (Jensen
(1986)). The empire building incentive and associated name recognition for the controlling
35By applying L’Hopital’s rule to (36) around γ =1 , we obtain the formula for ζ1 for logarithmic utility:





















33shareholder further distorts the controlling shareholders’ capital accumulation decision upward
and thus implies a greater utility cost to outside investors.
[Figure 3 here.]
While we show that the utility gain from increasing investor protection is large for outside
investors, we do not view policy interventions to improve investor protection as an easy task.
This is not surprising, since improving investor protection involves a diﬃcult political reform
process that may reduce the beneﬁts of incumbents. Figure 3 shows that this wealth redistrib-
ution is signiﬁcant, with controlling shareholders in the U.S. (Korea) losing about 1.7% (6.2%)
of their wealth when moving to the benchmark case of perfect investor protection. Figure 3 also
shows that controlling shareholders stand to loose more than minority investors if their equity
stake is small, and incentive alignment is weaker along this dimension as well. Moreover, the
controlling shareholders are less subject to the collective action problem than outside investors
are, because there are fewer controlling shareholders than outside investors and the amount of
rents at stake for each controlling shareholder is substantial. Thus, incumbent entrepreneurs
and controlling shareholders are often among the most powerful interest groups in the policy
making process, particularly in countries with weaker investor protection. It is in the vested in-
terests of controlling shareholders to maintain the status quo, since they enjoy the large private
beneﬁts at the cost of outside minority investors and future entrepreneurs.
7 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we further explore the model’s implications by testing two new predictions that
are unique to our model. Toward that end, it is useful to restate the implications of the model
on volatility (see Theorem 1).
Proposition 7 The standard deviations of GDP growth and stock returns are given by  i.
Speciﬁcally, we investigate the predictions that, conditional on exogenous sources of uncer-
tainty (arising from cross-country variation in  ), (i) the standard deviation of GDP growth is
positively correlated with the investment-capital ratio, and (ii) the standard deviation of stock
returns is positively correlated with the investment-capital ratio.36 We further provide comple-
36Note that the investment-capital ratio is invariant to a ﬁrst order with respect to  . Mathematically, the
derivative of the investment-capital ratio with respect to   is approximately zero when evaluated at realistically
low values of   (i.e., di/d  =0at   =0 ). This means that our model predicts that if all of the cross-country
variation in the highlighted volatility measures comes from variation in  , then we should not be able to detect
any association between the volatility measures and the investment-capital ratio, even if we do not control for
  in the regressions. Provided we ﬁnd such an association we can then reasonably conclude that it is not solely
due to cross-country variation in  . Intuitively, cross country variation in   in the model only adds noise to the
correlation between output growth volatility and the investment-capital ratio, because it makes the volatility
numbers change without any corresponding movement in investment.
34mentary evidence that the impact of investor protection on volatility appears to be subsumed
in the investment-capital ratio, especially so in the case of the volatility of stock returns.
7.1 Data
To measure the volatility of GDP growth we use the World Bank’s annual real per capita GDP.
To measure the volatility of stock returns we use the total monthly return series from MSCI
(starting in January of 1970 for some countries). Our sample consists of 44 countries for which
an MSCI index exists and the ratio of market capitalization to GDP is at least 10% by the year
2000.37
To test our predictions, we estimate a country’s long-run average investment-capital ratio
using aggregate data. Because the model’s capital-GDP ratio is constant, i.e., dY (t)/Y (t)=
dK (t)/K (t), we can use the capital accumulation equation (1) to obtain the long-run GDP
growth rate (i − δ). Hence, the investment-capital ratio is the sum of the long-run mean of real
GDP growth and the depreciation rate, which we take to be 0.07. Annual real GDP data is
obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators database for the period of 1960
to 2000. Note that the premise of this procedure is that of a constant capital-GDP ratio within
a country, but not across countries. Following King and Levine (1994), we estimate the long-run
mean GDP growth rate using a weighted average of the country’s average GDP growth rate
and the world’s average GDP growth rate with the weight on world growth equal to 0.75.T h e
w e i g h t i n go fg r o w t hr a t e si sm e a n tt oa c c o u n tf o rm e a n - r e v e r s i o ni ng r o w t hr a t e s .I ns p i t eo f
the balanced growth path assumption underlying this estimate, King and Levine (1994) show
that it produces estimates of investment-capital ratios that match quite well those computed
using the perpetual inventory method.
We conduct our tests controlling for several investor protection variables, which we divide
into two subsets. The ﬁrst set measures investor protection rules through the antidirector rights
variable introduced in La Porta et al. (1998) (ANTIDIR is higher with better investor protec-
tion) and a country’s legal origin (DCIVIL=1for a civil law country and 0 for a common law
country). In the second set of variables, we capture the notion that law enforcement is as im-
portant, if not more so, than the rules themselves in constraining opportunistic behavior. These
variables describe the eﬃciency of the judicial system (JUDICIAL), the rule of law (LAW), and
government corruption (CORRUPTION).38 While CORRUPTION does not directly reﬂect the
37The countries (and country abbreviations) are Argentina (ARG), Australia (AUL), Austria (AUT), Belgium
(BEL), Brazil (BRA), Canada (CAN), Chile (CHL), Chi n a( C H N ) ,C o l o m b i a( C O L ) ,D e n m a r k( D E N ) ,E g y p t
(EGY), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (GER), Greece (GRE), Hong Kong (HK), Hungary (HUN), India
( I N D ) ,I r e l a n d( I R E ) ,I s r a e l( I S R ) ,I t a l y( I T A ) ,J a p a n( J A P ) ,M a l a y s i a( M A L ) ,M e x i c o( M E X ) ,M o r o c c o( M O R ) ,
the Netherlands (NET), New Zealand (NZ), Norway (NOR), Pakistan (PAK), Peru (PER), Philippines (PHI),
Poland (POL), Portugal (POR), Singapore (SIN), South Africa (SA), South Korea (KOR), Spain (SPA), Sweden
(SWE), Switzerland (SWI), Thailand (THA), Turkey (TUR), UK, USA, and Venezuela (VEN). The variable
ANTI-DIR is not available for three countries (Hungary, Morocco, and Poland) and the variable RISKEXP is
not available for those three countries plus China.
38See La Porta et al. (1998) for a complete description of these variables obtained from the Business Interna-
35quality of law enforcement, it is nonetheless related as it pertains to the government’s attitude
towards the business community. For the enforcement-type variables, a higher score means
better investor protection.
In all regressions, we use control variables to account for other exogenous sources of volatility
(targeted at capturing cross-country variation in  ). As measures of aggregate uncertainty, we
use the long-run means of the volatility of inﬂation (SDINF) and of the volatility of changes in
the real exchange rate (SDRER) (see Pindyck and Solimano (1993)).39 To account for volatility
induced by government policies we use the long-run mean share of total government spending in
GDP (G/GDP) and an index of outright conﬁscation or forced nationalization from the Political
Risk Services Group (RISKEXP). A high score for RISKEXP means less risk of expropriation.
Finally, we control for the initial level of real GDP per capita in logs (GDP1960) and for the
degree of openness as given by the 1960 ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (OPEN).
7.2 Results
Figure 4 and Table 1 report the results for the relation between the standard deviation of
output growth and the investment-capital ratio. Figure 4 illustrates a positive (unconditional)
association as predicted by the model. Table 1 shows that the signiﬁcance of this association
survives the inclusion of control variables. Regression (1) in Table 1 documents the association
illustrated in Figure 4 (the coeﬃcient on I/K is 1.319 with a p-value of 0.006). The estimated
coeﬃcient implies that 81% of the volatility diﬀerential between the U.S. and Korea is due to
the diﬀerent investment-capital ratios in these countries.40 In regression (2) we add several
controls for exogenous sources of volatility. The coeﬃcient on the investment-capital ratio in-
creases slightly to 1.48 and remains signiﬁcant (p-value of 0.002). Higher SDINF and SDRER
are associated with higher volatility of GDP growth, but only the ﬁrst variable has a signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient (p-value of 0.01). Richer economies in 1960 also display greater volatility (p-value
on GDP1960 is 0.085). The eﬀect of the government is mixed. Higher share of spending on
GDP lowers variance (perhaps because several rich countries have large governments, and coun-
teracting the eﬀect of GDP1960), but higher risk of expropriation (lower RISKEXP) increases
variance.
[Table 1 and Figure 4 here.]
tional Corporation (JUDICIAL) and the International Country Risk Guide of the Political Risk Services Group
(LAW and CORRUPTION).
39Pindyck and Solimano (1993) suggest that the level of inﬂation can also be used as a proxy for aggregate
uncertainty. In our sample, the correlation between the mean inﬂation and the mean volatility of inﬂation is over
0.95, and including both measures induces strong multicollinearity problems.
40The investment-capital ratios in the U.S. and Korea are, respectively, 0.107 and 0.117, and the volatility
numbers for these countries are 0.0204 and 0.0377. Hence, 0.81 = 1.319 × (0.117 − 0.107)/(0.0377 − 0.0204).
36In regression (3) we regress the volatility of GDP growth on the investment-capital ratio
and the enforcement-type variables of investor protection. The investment-capital ratio displays
a lower estimated coeﬃcient, but maintains its signiﬁcance (p-value of 0.075). The investor
protection variables are also jointly signiﬁcant with a p-value of 0.0121.I n r e g r e s s i o n ( 4 ) w e
add the volatility controls to these other independent variables. Both the investment-capital
ratio and the investor protection variables are still signiﬁcant (p-values of 0.002 and 0.056,
respectively). The variables SDINF and SDRER are now both signiﬁcant (p-values of 0.003
and 0.054, respectively) and so are the government variables (p-value on G/GDP is 0.034 and
on RISKEXP is 0.003); GDP1960 is no longer signiﬁcant.
The antidirector rights variable (ANTIDIR) and the dummy for legal origin (DCIVIL) are
never jointly signiﬁcant, though in regression (5) DCIVIL is signiﬁcant and positive, implying
that countries with civil law have higher variance (over and above that induced through the
investment-capital ratio). More importantly, adding these variables does not remove the sig-
niﬁcance of the association of the investment-capital ratio to the standard deviation of GDP
growth (p-values on I/K of 0.001 in both regressions).
In summary, the evidence from Table 1 suggests that the volatility of output growth is
strongly associated with the investment-capital ratio, but we cannot reject an independent role
for the investor protection variables on output growth volatility (see regressions (3) and (4)).
Figure 5 and Table 2 present the results for the association between the standard deviation
of stock returns and the investment-capital ratio. As predicted by the model, Figure 5 illustrates
a positive (unconditional) association between these variables. Regression (1) in Table 2 gives
the numbers for the statistical association apparent in Figure 5 (slope coeﬃcient of 2.22 and p-
value of 0.033). This estimate implies that 31% of the stock return volatility diﬀerential between
the U.S. and Korea is due to the diﬀerential investment-capital ratios in these countries.41 In
regression (2) we add controls for exogenous volatility. The signiﬁcance of I/K remains (p-value
of 0.008) and in contrast to the volatility of output growth, only G/GDP and RISKEXP are
signiﬁcant (p-values of 0.07 and 0.049, respectively).
[Table 2 and Figure 5 here.]
Similarly to the results in Table 1, Table 2 shows that the enforcement variables have more
predictive power than the antidirector rights (ANTIDIR) and legal origin (DCIVIL) variables.
In regression (3), we combine the enforcement variables with the investment-capital ratio as
predictors of the stock return volatility. While the investment-capital ratio loses its signiﬁcance
(p-value of 0.506), the three investor protection variables are still jointly signiﬁcant (p-value of
41The investment to capital ratios in the U.S. and Korea are, respectively, 0.107 and 0.117, and the standard de-
viations of stock returns for these countries are 0.0447 and 0.1195. Hence, 0.31 = 2.22×(0.117 − 0.107)/(0.1195−
0.0447).
370.001). In particular, JUDICIAL (p-value of 0.046) indicates that countries with better investor
protection have lower volatility. This is reversed in regression (4) when we add controls for
exogenous causes of volatility. The investment-capital ratio is then signiﬁcant at the 3%l e v e l ,
but the investor protection variables have a joint signiﬁcance p-value of 0.2042. This suggests
that the impact of the investor protection variables occurs through the investment-capital ratio
only, as predicted by the model. Of the volatility controls SDINF and RISKEXP are signiﬁcant
(p-values of 0.031 and 0.093, respectively).
The antidirector rights variable (ANTIDIR) and the dummy for legal origin (DCIVIL) are
not jointly signiﬁcant after controlling for I/K (p-values of 0.1 and 0.3875 for regressions (5)
and (6), respectively). In regression (5), DCIVIL is signiﬁcant at the 10% level, suggesting as in
Table 1 that civil law countries have higher volatility of stock returns. However, controlling for
these measures of investor protection does not alter the signiﬁcance of the association between
the investment-capital ratio and the standard deviation of stock returns (p-values of 0.008 and
0.01 for regressions (5) and (6), respectively). In regression (6), only G/GDP and RISKEXP are
signiﬁcant (p-values of 0.054 and 0.046, respectively) as controls for other sources of volatility.
In summary, the evidence from Table 2 strongly suggests that the variance of stock returns
is positively related to the investment-capital ratio and that the impact on volatility of weak
investor protection occurs through the investment-capital ratio.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
Agency conﬂicts are at the core of modern corporate ﬁnance. The large corporate ﬁnance liter-
ature on investor protection has convincingly documented that corporations in most countries,
especially those with weak investor protection, often have controlling shareholders. Controlling
shareholders derive private beneﬁts at the cost of outside minority shareholders, which means
that ﬁrm value varies with investor protection regulations and enforcement.
Motivated by this vast literature, we construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model in which the controlling shareholder makes all corporate decisions in his own interest and
outside investors rationally formulate their asset allocation and consumption-saving decisions in
a competitive way. Despite the heterogeneity between the controlling shareholder and outside
investors, we are able to characterize the equilibrium in closed form. We show that the modeled
agency conﬂicts lead to distorted corporate investment and payout policies, which in turn aﬀect
asset prices. In equilibrium, however, asset prices aﬀect the ability of the controlling shareholder
to smooth consumption and thereby aﬀect corporate investment decisions. This diﬀerentiates
our work from other asset pricing models based on endowment or production economies and
homogeneous investors.
The model allows us to conveniently derive theoretical predictions on asset prices and re-
turns. Among others, our model predicts that countries with weaker investor protection have
38lower ﬁrm value as measured by Tobin’s q, a lower dividend payout ratio, more volatile stock
returns, higher equilibrium interest rates, larger equity premia, and, for reasonable values of risk
aversion, a larger dividend yield. We show that improving investor protection entails a signiﬁ-
cant wealth redistribution between insiders and outside investors. We also test two new model
predictions that relate the volatility of GDP growth and the volatility of stock returns to the
economy’s investment-capital ratio, even after controlling for measures of investor protection.
In order to focus on how investor protection aﬀects equilibrium asset prices and returns,
we choose to study asset pricing for each country in isolation. Motivated by the empirical
observation that currencies in countries with weaker investor protection experienced larger
depreciations during the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis, Albuquerque and Wang (2004) generalize
the current setup to a two-country world with shocks to total productivity and shocks to the
eﬃciency of new investment goods. They model these shocks as stationary regime switching
processes to analyze the business cycle properties of asset prices including the exchange rate.
Albuquerque and Wang (2004) show that investor protection has an economically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the equilibrium exchange rate that can explain the observed large depreciation of
currencies in countries with weak investor protection.
39Appendix
This Appendix contains the proofs for the theorem and propositions in the main text.
Throughout we make use of the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 h>ρ+ δ (1 − γ).
Assumption 2 1 − α<η .
Assumption 3 2(γ +1 )[ ( 1+ψ)h − ρ − δ (1 − γ)] 2 ≤ γ
£
1+( 1+ψ)h 2¤2.
Assumption 4 (1 − φ)h>i .
Assumption 5 ρ +( γ − 1)(i − δ) − γ (γ − 1)i2 2/2 > 0.
Assumption 1 states that the ﬁrm is suﬃciently productive and thus investment will be
positive for risk-neutral ﬁrms under perfect investor protection. Assumption 2 ensures agency
costs exist and lie within the economically interesting and relevant region. Assumptions 3 and 4
ensure positive and real investment and positive dividends, respectively. Assumption 5 gives rise
to ﬁnite and positive Tobin’s q and dividend yield. While we describe the intuition behind these
assumptions, obviously we cannot take the intuition and implications of these assumptions in
isolation. These assumptions jointly ensure that the equilibrium exists with positive and ﬁnite
net private beneﬁts, investment rate, dividend, and Tobin’s q.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 . The ﬁrst-order condition (23) gives
m−γα = A1
¡
1 −  2iγ
¢
, (A.1)
where m = M/K and i = I/K are the controlling shareholder’s equilibrium consumption-
capital ratio, and the ﬁrm’s investment-capital ratio, respectively. Plugging the stealing function
into (7) gives










= α((1 + ψ)h − i) , (A.2)
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The above equality implies the following relation:
((1 + ψ)h − i)
¡
1 −  2γi
¢
= y, (A.3)
40where y is the dividend yield and is given by
y = ρ − (1 − γ)(i − δ)+
1
2
γ (1 − γ) 2i2 . (A.4)






This inequality will be used in proving the propositions.







 2i2 − γ
£
1+( 1+ψ)h 2¤
i +( 1+ψ)h − (1 − γ)δ − ρ =0 . (A.6)
For γ>0, solving the quadratic equation (A.6) gives
i =
1















2γ(γ +1 )  2 ((1 + ψ)h − (1 − γ)δ − ρ)




In order to ensure that the investment-capital ratio given in (A.7) is a real number, we require
that ∆ > 0, which is explicitly stated in Assumption 3. Next, we choose between the two roots
for the investment-capital ratio given in (A.7). We note that when   =0 , the investment-capital
ratio is
i =[ ( 1+ψ)h − (1 − γ)δ − ρ]/γ,
as directly implied by (A.6). Therefore, by a continuity argument, for  >0, the natural solution
for the investment-capital ratio is the smaller root in (A.7) and is thus given by
i =
1










We also solve for the value function coeﬃcient A1 and obtain
A1 =
m−γα





where y is the dividend yield and is given by (A.4).








41It is equivalent to verify limT→∞ E
¡
e−ρTK(T)1−γ¢



































Therefore, the transversality condition will be satisﬁed if ρ>0 and the dividend yield is positive
(y>0), as stated in Assumption 5.
Now, we turn to the optimal consumption and asset allocation decisions for the controlling








Recall that in equilibrium, the minority investor’s wealth is all invested in ﬁrm equity and thus
his initial wealth satisﬁes W0 =( 1− α)qK0. Since the minority investor’s wealth dynamics
and the ﬁrm’s capital accumulation dynamics are both geometric Brownian motions with the
same drift and volatility parameters, it follows immediately that the transversality condition
for minority investor is also met if and only if the dividend yield y is positive, as stated in




































where the second line uses (.1). Thus, the value function coeﬃcient A2 is given by A2 =1 /yγ.
I nS e c t i o n6 . 3 ,w eu s et h ee x p l i c i tf o r m u l af o rt h em i n o r i t yi n v e s t o r ’ sv a l u ef u n c t i o nJ2(W0) to
calculate the utility cost of imperfect investor protection.
To complete the proof of the theorem we give the equilibrium interest rate and Tobin’s q.
In equilibrium, the minority investor’s consumption is C2 (t)=( 1− α)D(t). Applying Ito’s
lemma to the minority investor’s marginal utility, ξ2(t)=e−ρtC2 (t)
−γ, we obtain the process
for the stochastic discount factor:
dξ2(t)
ξ2(t)






γ (γ +1 )dt.
The drift of ξ2 equals −rξ2,w h e r er is the equilibrium interest rate. Importantly, the implied
equilibrium interest rate by the controlling shareholder’s ξ1 and the minority investor’s ξ2 are
equal. This conﬁrms the leading assumption that the controlling shareholders and the minority
investors ﬁnd it optimal not to trade the risk-free asset at the equilibrium interest rate.
Tobin’s q can be obtained by computing the ratio of market value to the replacement cost












42Using the deﬁnitions of ξ2(t)=e−ρtC2 (t)
−γ = e−ρt (yW2 (t))
−γ, D(t)/K (t)=d,a n dW2 (t)/K (t)=













using the conjectured controlling shareholder’s value function J1 (K).










d +( ψ + φ)h
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1 −  2iγ
¶
,
where the ﬁrst equality uses (A.9), the second equality uses (14), and the third follows from
simpliﬁcation.
Ac o n s t a n tq and dividend-capital ratio d immediately implies that the drift coeﬃcients for
dividend, stock price, and capital stock are all the same, i.e., µD = µP = µK = i − δ,a n d
the volatility coeﬃcients for dividend, stock price, and capital stock are also the same, i.e.,
σD = σP = σK =  i. A constant risk premium λ is an immediate implication of constant µP,
constant dividend-capital ratio d, and constant equilibrium risk-free interest rate.
Proof of the Free Rider Argument in Section 3.3. We elaborate on the details of
how our free rider argument gives rise to a constant ownership structure over time. We use
J1 (K;α) to denote the explicit dependence of the controlling shareholder’s value function on













where the last equality uses the functional form of the value function. The derivative in (A.14)
describes the increase in the controlling shareholder’s lifetime utility due to a marginal increase
of his ownership. This is not his monetary valuation because the controlling shareholder is
risk-averse (γ>0). To derive his monetary valuation, or willingness to pay, we ﬁrst note that
in equilibrium, the controlling shareholder’s stock market wealth is proportional to the ﬁrm’s
capital stock, in that W = αˆ qK,w h e r eˆ q is the controlling shareholder’s shadow Tobin’s q given
















Dividing dJ1/dα by the marginal value function dJ1(W)/dW gives the controlling shareholder’s
















´−γ = αˆ q
d
m
K = qK = Pα,
43where the penultimate equality uses the relation between Tobin’s q and ˆ q (see (A.9)) and Pα
is the time-t price per share set by minority shareholders. Note that ˆ Pα a sg i v e ni nS e c t i o n5
represents the value of the existing shares for the controlling shareholder and is diﬀerent from
his willingness to pay as given by Pα when acquiring additional shares.
The free rider problem is now apparent. If the equilibrium is for all minority shareholders
to sell at Pα, then by deviating from this equilibrium, an inﬁnitesimal investor can gain because
trading with other minority investors after the trade with the controlling shareholder has taken
place yields a higher valuation Pα0. This higher valuation results from a higher q due to a higher
equity share of the controlling shareholder (see Proposition 3). Finally, note that selling by the
controlling shareholder for consumption does not occur in equilibrium either. This is because
the controlling shareholder would only sell at price Pα, but the minority investors, anticipating
higher extraction of private beneﬁts, would be willing to pay less than Pα.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Deﬁne
f(x)=





γx+( 1+ψ)h − ρ − δ (1 − γ). (A.15)
Note that f (i)=0 ,w h e r ei is the equilibrium investment-capital ratio and the smaller of the
zeros of f.A l s o ,f (x) < 0 for any value of x between the two zeros of f and is greater than or










< 0 if and only if Assumption 5 is met. Hence, under Assumption 5,
i<γ −1 −2. Also, under Assumption 1, f (0) = (1 + ψ)h−ρ−δ (1 − γ) > 0 which implies that
i>0.
Abusing notation slightly, use (A.15) to deﬁne the equilibrium investment-capital ratio








1 − γ 2i
¢
1 − γ 2i + ((1 + ψ)h − i) 2.
At the smaller zero of f, i<γ −1 −2. Together with (1 + ψ)h − i>(1 − φ)h − i = d>0,t h i s
implies that di/dψ > 0.










and note that di/dψ > 0. Hence, the interest rate is lower when investor protection improves
i fa n do n l yi f1 >  2 (γ +1 )i, or using (A.8), if and only if
γ>2[(1+ψ)h − (γ +1 )( ( 1− γ)δ + ρ)] 2.
44This inequality is always true if (1 + ψ)h − (γ + 1)((1 − γ)δ + ρ) < 0; otherwise, it holds for
suﬃciently low  , h,o rψ.
Proof of Proposition 3. We prove the proposition for investor protection. The case for
the equity share of the controlling shareholder is then immediate. Use the expression for the
dividend yield in (34) to express Tobin’s q as the ratio between the dividend-capital ratio d and



























































where the inequality uses γ>0 and di/dη < 0.








1 − γ 2i
¢
≶ 0 iﬀ γ ≶ 1,
and note that the agency cost parameter ψ decreases with both investor protection and η and
ownership α. The proposition then follows.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . Weaker investor protection or lower share of equity held by the
controlling shareholder both lead to a higher agency cost parameter ψ.P r o p o s i t i o n 1 s h o w s
that a higher ψ leads to more investment and hence both higher volatility of stock returns
σ2
P =  2i2 and higher expected excess returns λ = γσ2
P. To see the eﬀect of investor protection
on total expected equity returns, we note that
d
¡









which is strictly positive under Assumption 5. Expected returns are higher with weaker investor
protection or a lower share of equity held by the controlling shareholder.



































1 − γ 2i
¢
> 0,
45where the inequality uses 1−γ 2 i>0 and di/dη < 0 (from Proposition 1), and dlogd/dη > 0.












1 − γ 2i
¢
< 0,
where the inequality follows from di/dη < 0.
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Figure 1: Stock market revaluation when moving to perfect investor protection, as measured
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Controlling Shareholder Equity, α
Figure 2: Fraction of the risk premium that is due to weak investor protection in percent,
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Controlling Shareholder Equity, α
Figure 3: Utility cost of imperfect investor protection for minority investors (1−ζ2) and utility















































































Figure 4: Scatter plot and linear ﬁt of the volatility of GDP growth on the investment-capital

























































































Figure 5: Scatter plot and linear ﬁt of the volatility of stock returns on the investment-capital
ratio across countries. See main text for country abbreviations.Table 1
Ordinary Least Squares Regressions: Standard Deviation of Real GDP Growth
Independent
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I/K 1.319 1.480 0.771 1.691 1.102 1.480











SDINF 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.010 0.003 0.059
SDRER 0.0314 0.058 0.056
0.344 0.054 0.145
G/GDP -0.055 -0.004 -0.051
0.014 0.034 0.025
RISKEXP -0.004 -0.006 -0.004
0.031 0.003 0.033
OPEN -0.001 -0.004 -0.001
0.467 0.120 0.449
GDP1960 0.009 0.003 0.010
0.085 0.695 0.093
Intercept -0.111 -0.128 -0.036 -0.137 -0.101 -0.134
0.032 0.030 0.489 0.042 0.004 0.019
Number of Obs. 44 40 40 40 40 40
Adjusted R2 0.164 0.632 0.258 0.673 0.191 0.630
Joint Test 0.012 0.056 0.121 0.236
Notes: Variables are the investment-capital ratio (I/K), antidirector rights (ANTIDIR), a dummy for civil law countries
(DCIVIL), the eﬃciency of the judicial system (JUDICIAL), the rule of law (LAW), corruption (CORRUPTION), the
standard deviations of inﬂation (SDINF) and of changes in the real exchange rate (SDRER), the share of government
spending in GDP (G/GDP), the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (OPEN), the 1960-level of real GDP per capita in
logs (GDP1960), and risk of expropriation (RISKEXP). Each cell reports the coeﬃcient estimate and the White-corrected
p-value on the null that the coeﬃcient is zero. ‘Joint Test’ refers to a joint signiﬁcance test of the coeﬃcients on the
investor protection variables.Table 2
Ordinary Least Squares Regressions: Standard Deviation of Stock Returns
Independent
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I/K 2.222 2.958 0.771 2.828 2.898 2.995











SDINF 0.0002 0.001 0.001
0.961 0.031 0.798
SDRER 0.175 0.155 0.119
0.145 0.250 0.467
G/GDP -0.141 -0.089 -0.184
0.070 0.273 0.054
RISKEXP -0.011 -0.013 -0.012
0.049 0.093 0.046
OPEN -0.104 -0.0053 -0.011
0.200 0.543 0.171
GDP1960 0.014 0.012 0.016
0.307 0.584 0.267
Intercept -0.153 -0.181 0.090 -0.148 -0.232 -0.156
0.177 0.183 0.526 0.349 0.037 0.258
Number of Obs. 44 40 40 40 40 40
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.444 0.391 0.456 0.066 0.447
Joint Test 0.001 0.204 0.100 0.388
Notes: Variables are the investment-capital ratio (I/K), antidirector rights (ANTIDIR), a dummy for civil law countries
(DCIVIL), the eﬃciency of the judicial system (JUDICIAL), the rule of law (LAW), corruption (CORRUPTION), the
standard deviations of inﬂation (SDINF) and of changes in the real exchange rate (SDRER), the share of government
spending in GDP (G/GDP), the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (OPEN), the 1960-level of real GDP per capita in
logs (GDP1960), and risk of expropriation (RISKEXP). Each cell reports the coeﬃcient estimate and the White-corrected
p-value on the null that the coeﬃcient is zero. ‘Joint Test’ refers to a joint signiﬁcance test of the coeﬃcients on the
investor protection variables.